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ABSTRACT 
Can one consent to sex in advance? Scholars have neglected the 
temporal dimension of sexual consent, and this theoretical gap has 
significant practical implications. With the aging of the population, more 
and more people will be living for extended periods of time with cognitive 
impairments that deprive them of the legal capacity to consent to sex. 
However, they may still manifest sexual desire, so consenting prospectively 
to sex in this context serves several purposes. These include protecting 
long-term sexual partners from prosecution by the state, ensuring sexually 
fulfilled lives for their future disabled selves, or preserving important 
sexual identities or relationships. The law currently provides a device for 
prospective decision-making in the face of incapacity: the advance 
directive. The central claim of this Article is that the law should recognize 
sexual advance directives. In other words, people facing both chronic 
conditions that threaten their legal capacity to make decisions and 
institutional care that threatens sexual self-determination should be able to 
consent prospectively to sex or empower an agent to make decisions about 
sex on their behalf. To justify this claim, the Article introduces a novel 
theory of sexual consent—the consensus of consents—that diffuses the 
longstanding philosophical debates over whether advance directives should 
be legally enforceable. With this normative foundation, the Article then 
draws on insights from criminal law, fiduciary law, and the law of wills to 
fashion a workable regime of sexual advance directives that adequately 
protects individuals from the risk of sexual abuse. 
INTRODUCTION 
In May of 2007, a woman and her longtime male partner engaged in 
consensual kinky sex.1 Specifically, the woman consented to erotic 
asphyxiation, or the practice of choking during a sexual encounter as a way 
to restrict oxygen flow and enhance sexual arousal.2 She also consented to 
sexual penetration while unconscious.3 The man then choked the woman, 
something which they had done before, and she passed out for 
approximately three minutes.4 During that time, the man tied the woman’s 
 
1.  This narrative is adapted from the facts reported in R. v. J.A., [2011] 2 S.C.R. 440 (Can.) and 
R. v. J.A. (2010), 100 O.R. 3d 676 (Can. Ont. C.A.). 
2.  See Lisa Downing, Beyond Safety: Erotic Asphyxiation and the Limits of SM Discourse, in 
SAFE, SANE, AND, CONSENSUAL: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON SADOMASOCHISM 119, 120–21 
(Darren Langdridge & Meg Barker eds., 2007) (describing the practice). 
3.  This is subject to some dispute in the case. She initially reported to the police that she had not 
consented, but later recanted that testimony, claiming that she made the allegation as part of a custody 
dispute over their two-year old son. See R. v. J.A., 2 S.C.R. 440, at para. 5. 
4.  Id. 
1 BONI-SAENZ 1-47 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2016  2:32 PM 
2016] Sexual Advance Directives 3 
arms behind her back and inserted a dildo into her anus.5 When she 
regained consciousness, he removed the dildo, and they had consensual 
penile-vaginal intercourse as well.6 After they had both finished, she said 
her safe word—“Tweety Bird”—and he cut her free of her bonds.7 Despite 
the woman’s consent, the State still prosecuted the man for sexual assault, 
claiming that she could not consent in advance as a matter of law.8 Lower 
courts divided on the issue, and the case went all the way to the Supreme 
Court of Canada.9 
This case presents the important legal question of whether one can 
consent prospectively to sex.10 Scholars have neglected this temporal 
dimension of sexual consent, as it is assumed to be contemporaneous with 
the sexual act it authorizes.11 This theoretical gap has significant practical 
implications beyond the context of temporary incapacity and kinky sex. 
With the aging of the population, more and more people will be living for 
extended periods of time with cognitive impairments. Dementia and other 
conditions can deprive individuals of the legal capacity to consent to sex, 
effectively barring them from having a sexual life. However, sexual desire 
and behaviors often continue unimpeded, as increasingly depicted in 
popular culture.12 
 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. at para. 8. 
7.  R. v. J.A. (2010), 100 O.R. 3d 676, at para. 17 (Can. Ont. C.A.). See Margo Kaplan, Sex-
Positive Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 117 (2014) (“The BDSM community requires the use of a ‘safe 
word’ that, if uttered by the submissive, requires the dominant to immediately cease his or her 
actions.”). 
8.  See R. v. A.(J.), 2008 O.N.C.J. 195, paras. 34–37 (Can. On. Ct. J.). 
9.  The trial court convicted the man, holding that she could not “legally consent to sexual activity 
that takes place when she is unconscious.” Id. at para. 45. The appellate court disagreed, holding that 
there was “no basis for holding that, as a matter of general principle a person cannot legally consent in 
advance to sexual activity expected to occur while the person is either unconscious or asleep.” R v. J.A. 
(2010), 100 O.R. 3d 676, at para. 69. The Supreme Court ultimately sided with the State. See R. v. J.A., 
2 S.C.R. 440, at para. 66 (“The definition of consent for sexual assault requires the complainant to 
provide actual active consent throughout every phase of the sexual activity. It is not possible for an 
unconscious person to satisfy this requirement, even if she expresses her consent in advance.”).  
10.  See infra Part I.A. 
11.  See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 496 A.2d 1067, 1069–70 (Me. 1985) (noting that withdrawal of 
consent during sex still results in rape even if consent was initially and freely given). There are a couple 
notable exceptions. See, e.g., ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 155–57 (2003) 
(briefly discussing a couple of scenarios in which concurrent consent might not be morally required); 
Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New 
Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 53 (2002) (critiquing how the common law 
disempowered women by assuming their consent had no temporal boundaries, particularly in marriage). 
There are also a couple general treatments of consent that touch on the temporal dimension while 
drawing on examples from the sexual domain. See, e.g., PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT 247–
63 (2004); Jonathan Witmer-Rich, It’s Good to Be Autonomous: Prospective Consent, Retrospective 
Consent, and the Foundation of Consent in the Criminal Law, 5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 377 (2011). 
12.  For example, HBO’s recent comedy series Getting On deals explicitly with issues of sex 
among older adults with cognitive impairments in institutions. See Willa Paskin, Getting On: I’ve Never 
Laughed So Hard About the Frail and Failing Elderly, SLATE (Nov. 22, 2013), 
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In this social and demographic context, individuals may want to 
consent prospectively to sex for a variety of reasons. They might have an 
interest in enabling sexually fulfilling lives for their future disabled selves, 
in preserving important sexual identities or relationships, or in protecting 
spouses from criminal prosecution for rape.13 These interests are 
particularly threatened in the context of residential care, where institutions 
adopt sexually restrictive policies and aggressively police sex among 
residents for fear of liability. Unfortunately, this is not a hypothetical issue. 
In 2015, Iowa state prosecutors tried a man for sexual assault because he 
allegedly had sexual contact with his wife, who was suffering from 
Alzheimer’s Disease, while she was residing in a nursing home.14 
The law currently provides a tool for advance decision-making in the 
face of expected incapacity: the advance directive.15 This legal device 
permits individuals to set forth consent decisions in advance or to empower 
agents to make said consent decisions in the event of legal incapacity. 
These tools have been part of the legal landscape for many years. Living 
wills have been used in the health-care domain to permit advance decisions 
about end-of-life treatment, and powers of attorney allow one to delegate 
financial decision-making authority as well. However, scholars have never 
explored whether this traditional legal device should be applied to the 
unique decision-making domain of sexuality. 
The central claim of this Article is that the law should recognize sexual 
advance directives for people with persistent acquired incapacity living in 
long-term care institutions. In other words, people facing chronic 
conditions that threaten their sexual-consent capacity, such as Alzheimer’s 
Disease, should be able to engage in sexual advance planning to preserve 
the possibility of a sexual life while in residential care, such as nursing 
homes. To justify this claim, the Article introduces a novel theory of sexual 
consent—the consensus of consents—that diffuses the longstanding 
 
http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/television/2013/11/hbo_s_new_comedy_starring_laurie_metcalf_gett
ing_on_reviewed.html (describing the sexual subplots). The issue of Alzheimer’s Disease has also 
permeated popular culture, with Julianne Moore recently winning an Oscar for portraying a fifty-year-
old diagnosed with the illness. See Steve Dove, Julianne Moore Wins Oscar for Best Actress in a 
Leading Role, OSCAR.GO.COM (Feb. 27, 2015, 12:52 AM), http://oscar.go.com/news/oscar-
news/150222-julianne-moore-wins-best-actress-oscar-2015. 
13.  See infra Part I.C. 
14.  See Complaint & Affidavit at 1, State v. Rayhons, No. 02411 FECR010718 (Iowa Dist. Ct. 
Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.dps.state.ia.us/commis/pib/Releases/2014/ 
Rayhons_Complaint_&_Affidavit.pdf (charging Henry Rayhons for with sexual assault); Bryan Gruley, 
Rape Case Asks if Wife with Dementia Can Say Yes to Her Husband, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 8, 2014, 11:00 
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-09/rape-case-asks-if-wife-with-dementia-can-
say-yes-to-her-husband (describing the case); Tony Leys & Grant Rodgers, Rayhons: ‘Truth Finally 
Came Out’ with Not Guilty Verdict, DES MOINES REG. (Apr. 22, 2015, 7:37 PM), 
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/crime-and-courts/2015/04/22/henry-rayhons-acquitted-
sexual-abuse/26105699/ (discussing the eventual acquittal). 
15.  See infra Part I.B. 
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philosophical divides over whether advance directives should be legally 
enforceable. Typically, these debates focus on situations of conflict 
between a past self, who expressed an advance decision while still 
possessing capacity, and a present self, who lacks capacity but would be 
harmed by the implementation of that advance decision. Philosophers have 
vigorously debated whether the past self or the present self should prevail.16 
These disputes, however, ignore the fact that the interests of the past self 
and present self will actually align in many situations. This is particularly 
true in the sexual domain.17 When the past self provides prospective 
consent and the present self tokens contemporaneous consent, there is a 
consensus of consents that makes legal recognition of sexual advance 
directives attractive from multiple philosophical perspectives.18 
With this normative foundation, the Article then draws on insights 
from the law of wills, criminal law, and fiduciary law to fashion a workable 
regime of sexual advance directives that adequately protects individuals 
from the risk of sexual abuse. To ensure that prospective consent is 
authentic, the sexual advance directive must be executed with the 
heightened level of formalities typically required of wills—a writing, 
signature, and attestation of two witnesses.19 These formalities provide 
courts with good evidence of prospective consent and protect individuals in 
memorializing their sexual wishes. To ensure that contemporaneous 
consent is voluntary, the individual must verbally or nonverbally express 
consent to sexual contact. In other words, silence or inaction should not be 
taken to constitute consent, as it risks being the product of a cognitive or 
communicative impairment instead. This affirmative consent standard has 
been controversial in criminal law, but it is justified with this population to 
ensure that there is a genuine mental state of acquiescence to a sexual act. 
In certain cases, ensuring that there is in fact affirmative consent will 
require privacy tradeoffs in the context of institutional care.20 Finally, to 
protect the individual with cognitive impairments against harmful 
consequences of sexual activity, long-term care institutions and agents 
acting under a sexual advance directive must comply with a duty of care, 
taking reasonable steps to shield the person with cognitive impairments 
from objective welfare threats stemming from the sexual activity.21 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides the background for 
understanding the doctrines of consent and capacity as well as the advance 
directive as a legal device. It also provides the rationale for focusing on 
 
16.  See infra Part II.A. 
17.  See infra Part II.B. 
18.  See infra Part II.B. 
19.  See infra Part III.A.1. 
20.  See infra Part III.A.2. 
21.  See infra Part III.B. 
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sexual advance planning for persistent acquired incapacity in the context of 
long-term care institutions. Part II lays out the philosophical divide on 
advance directives and argues for the consensus of consents as the 
normative basis of sexual advance directives. Part III turns to issues of 
implementation, examining how sexual advance directives might operate in 
practice. 
I. CONSENT, CAPACITY, AND ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
This Part provides the social and legal background for understanding 
sexual advance directives. Section A defines the key terms of consent and 
capacity. Section B examines the law of advance directives. Section C 
introduces sexual advance directives and explains their application to 
situations of persistent acquired incapacity in the institutional context. 
A. Consent and Capacity 
Consent is the linchpin of moral sex.22 It is a communication that 
conveys a mental state of acquiescence toward a particular sexual act,23 and 
 
22.  See Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 123 (1996) 
(“[C]onsent can function to transform the morality of another’s conduct—to make an action right when 
it would otherwise be wrong. For example, consent turns a trespass into a dinner party; a battery into a 
handshake; a theft into a gift; an invasion of privacy into an intimate moment; a commercial 
appropriation of name and likeness into a biography.”). While consent makes impermissible actions 
permissible, it does not “imply that it is harmless, or good for either party, or good for both of them, or 
good for the world.” Robin West, Sex, Law, and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 221, 235 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer, eds., 2010). 
 For the purposes of this Article, I define sex to include any activity that could be prosecuted under a 
state’s criminal sexual conduct statute. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-651 (2015) (defining “sexual 
battery” as “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any intrusion, however slight, 
of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s 
body, except when such intrusion is accomplished for medically recognized treatment or diagnostic 
purposes.”). Such conduct would likely be actionable under a given state’s corresponding tort law as 
well. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 194 n.4 (1991) (noting the strong 
overlap between criminal law and tort law). The reason for this particular formulation is that that this 
Article is addressed to the legal liability that might flow from unlawful sex, and how sexual advance 
directives might make such sex lawful. Sex and sexuality are obviously more expansive and diverse 
categories than this, influenced not only by law but also by social context. See Jeffrey Weeks, 
SEXUALITY 7 (2d ed. 2003) (claiming that “what we define as ‘sexuality’ is a historical construction, 
which brings together a host of different biological and mental possibilities—gender identity, bodily 
differences, reproductive capacities, needs, desires, and fantasies . . . which need not be linked together, 
and in other cultures have not been”). 
23.  See Emily Sherwin, Infelicitous Sex, 2 LEGAL THEORY 209, 216 (1996) (“Consent is two 
things: It is both a subjective decision and a social act—a transaction between parties.”). This definition 
conceptualizes consent as composed of both a mental state and a communicative act. Many theorists, 
however, believe that it is only one or the other. See, e.g., DAVID ARCHARD, SEXUAL CONSENT 4 
(1998) (arguing that consent is an “act rather than a state of mind.”); Larry Alexander, The Moral 
Magic of Consent (II), 2 LEGAL THEORY 165, 165 (1996) (arguing that consent is an intentional mental 
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it embodies the value of self-determination in the sexual decision-making 
space.24 Popular culture has absorbed this understanding of consent, and it 
is a central theme around which activists have organized campaigns against 
sexual assault.25 
Consent is also an important part of lawful sex.26 In the criminal 
context, the State must typically prove non-consent as an element of the 
crime of sexual assault or rape.27 As an evidentiary matter, the alleged 
victim’s behavior must show non-consent in some way to satisfy this 
element.28 Some states, however, have adopted an affirmative consent 
standard, which requires some verbal or nonverbal evidence of consent; 
without it, silence constitutes non-consent.29 Under either rule, the burden 
 
state). Since consent gives notice to a sexual partner about what her obligations are, some 
communicative element seems essential to the legal system. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 11, at 146. 
24.  This self-determination value has been conceptualized in many different ways. See, e.g., 
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 
99 (1998) (sexual autonomy); Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on 
Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 841 (1999) (sexual agency); Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, 
Sexuality and Incapacity, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1225 (2015) (sexual capability); Jed Rubenfeld, The 
Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1425–27 (2013) 
(self-possession). 
25.  See Julia Penelope, Speaking Out, in COUNTERBALANCE: GENDERED PERSPECTIVES FOR 
WRITING AND LANGUAGE 68, 72 (Carolyn Logan ed., 1997) (“In public discourse, rape has become 
‘unconsented sexual activity.’”); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law, 98 
MINN. L. REV. 1453, 1475 (2014) (describing how consent is the “touchstone” of the SlutWalk 
movement). 
26.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406 (2001) (“A person commits sexual assault by 
intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person 
without consent of such person.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402(1) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2016) 
(“A person commits rape when the actor has sexual intercourse with another person without the 
victim’s consent.”); People v. Cicero, 204 Cal. Rptr. 582, 590 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“[T]he law of rape 
primarily guards the integrity of a woman’s will and the privacy of her sexuality from an act of 
intercourse undertaken without her consent.”). This incorporation of consent into legal definitions can 
be attributed to the work of feminist legal reformers. See Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 11–20 (1998) (discussing the history of rape reform). However, many criminal statutes retain 
requirements of force on the part of the attacker or resistance on the part of the victim, showing how the 
law has not kept up with social understandings of permissible sex. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Rape on 
and off Campus, 65 EMORY L.J. 1, 15 n.73 (2015) (detailing the states that still retain force and 
resistance elements). 
27.  See State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713, 717 (Conn. 1989) (“Consent is not made an affirmative 
defense under our sex offense statutes, so, . . . the burden is upon the state to prove lack of consent 
beyond a reasonable doubt whenever the issue is raised.”). 
28.  See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1126 (1986) (noting this requirement and how it 
differs from how the law treats nonconsent in other areas). 
29.  See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3251(3) (West 2009) (“‘Consent’ means words or actions 
by a person indicating a voluntary agreement to engage in a sexual act.”); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 940.225(4) (West 2005) (“‘Consent’, as used in this section, means words or overt actions by a person 
who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual 
intercourse or sexual contact.”); State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992) (“[P]ermission to 
engage in sexual penetration must be affirmative and it must be given freely, but that permission may 
be inferred either from acts or statements reasonably viewed in light of the surrounding 
circumstances.”). 
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of proof beyond a reasonable doubt remains with the State.30 In the tort law 
context, non-consent is also something that must be proved as part of the 
prima facie case in a suit for battery.31 Thus, the burden is on the plaintiff 
to prove non-consent by a preponderance of the evidence.32 
In order for consent to be legally valid, the person granting it must have 
the capacity to consent.33 There are a variety of conditions that may render 
one legally incapable of consenting, including intoxication, 
unconsciousness, or illness.34 These impairments can prevent one from 
processing the relevant sexual decision at the time of the sexual act. The 
legal test for capacity to consent to sex in most states requires that one have 
the mental capacity to understand the “nature and consequences” of the 
relevant sexual decision.35 Thus, in order to have the capacity to consent to 
sex, one must have the capacity to understand that a particular sexual act 
could entail such things as pleasure, pregnancy, or sexually transmitted 
disease. If sex proceeds with an enthusiastic affirmative communication—
 
30.  See Gates v. State, 283 N.W.2d 474, 477–78 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (rejecting challenges to 
the constitutionality of Wisconsin’s affirmative consent statute due to vagueness or shifting the burden 
to the defendant); NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL MODEL INSTRUCTIONS, SEXUAL ASSAULT 
(FORCE/COERCION), § 2C:14-2c(1) (revised 2005), 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/criminal/charges/sexual008.pdf (clarifying the jury’s duties in 
determining affirmative consent). 
31.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“The absence of 
such consent is inherent in the very idea of those invasions of interests of personality which, at common 
law, were the subject of an action of trespass for battery, assault, or false imprisonment. Therefore the 
absence of consent is a matter essential to the cause of action, and it is uniformly held that it must be 
proved by the plaintiff as a necessary part of his case.”). There is some ambiguity on this point, as 
sometimes consent is framed as part of an affirmative defense by the defendant. See Nancy J. Moore, 
Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion and Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585, 1604–
06 (2012) (discussing the lack of clarity in the Restatement). 
32.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. a (“As on other issues in civil cases, the 
plaintiff is required . . . to sustain his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
33.  See WESTEN, supra note 11, at 7 (describing the requirements of consent as competence, 
knowledge, and freedom). This Article deals primarily with the first of these requirements, what I call 
capacity. Knowledge and freedom are more loosely enforced as conditions of valid sexual consent, even 
if they might be upheld as necessary for consent in other areas, such as commercial law. See Jane E. 
Larson, “Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature ‘Deceit’”: A Feminist Rethinking of 
Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 413 (1993). 
34.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(7)(b) (2001) (“The victim is incapable of consent by 
reason of mental disorder, mental defect, drugs, alcohol, sleep or any other similar impairment of 
cognition . . . .”); 3 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 316–
17 (1986). Even if one has legal capacity, there are many non-cognitive conditions that may render one 
legally incapable of granting sexual consent. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2015) 
(in legal custody or under educational supervision); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b) (West 2011) 
(if the perpetrator is a mental health services provider, clergyman, or residential institutional staff). 
35.  See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 890 P.2d 587, 592 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (“To appreciate the 
nature and consequences of engaging in an act of sexual penetration, the victim must have the capacity 
to understand the full range of ordinary and foreseeable social, medical, and practical consequences that 
the act entails.”). States vary in terms of what consequences they deem relevant to the analysis. See 
Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 344–46 
(discussing the various tests). 
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the “Yes”—but the person lacks the capacity to consent, the subsequent 
sexual contact is still criminal or tortious.36 
Sexual consent is normally considered to be more or less 
contemporaneous with the sexual act it authorizes.37 This creates periods of 
time in everyone’s lives in which they lack the ability to legally consent, 
and potential sexual partners face legal sanction for engaging individuals 
during those periods.38 This legal prohibition has simultaneously protective 
and restrictive effects.39 It helps to protect those who are vulnerable during 
temporary periods of legal incapacity, for instance in helping to prevent 
adults from having sex with twelve-year-olds, who lack capacity by virtue 
of age, or to prevent college students from having sex with their 
unconscious classmates, who may lack capacity by virtue of intoxication.40 
The legal prohibition also has restrictive effects, which are felt most 
strongly when there are persistent forms of incapacity at issue.41 For 
example, people with persistent lifelong conditions, such as Down 
Syndrome, or with persistent acquired conditions, such as Alzheimer’s 
Disease, may be denied sexual lives altogether, even though they might 
retain sexual desires.42 
 
36.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A (noting that for consent to be valid the 
person must have the capacity for consent); 3 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 282 
(15th ed. 1995) (describing incapacity as vitiating consent in the context of rape). 
37.  See State v. Nowlin, 818 A.2d 1237, 1239 (N.H. 2003) (discussing whether contemporaneous 
conduct indicated lack of consent). The notable exception to this is the marital rape exception, where 
consent to marry was deemed to constitute prospective consent to sex for the duration of the marriage. 
See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 1373 (2000). 
38.  See Boni-Saenz, supra note 24, at 1212–13 (discussing the four types of legal incapacity). 
39. See id. at 1203–04. These protective/restrictive effects key into the longstanding feminist 
debate over how sexuality should be regulated so as to protect from danger without cutting off avenues 
to pleasure. See Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 181, 208 (2001). 
40.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405(A) (2001) (setting the age of consent at 
eighteen); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-1.50(b) (West 2007 & Supp. 2016) (seventeen); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 200.364(6) (LexisNexis 2012) (sixteen); Commonwealth v. Fuller, 845 N.E.2d 434, 439 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (noting that prosecutors often employ incapacity doctrines in cases when consent 
is ambiguous or contested by defendants); Wilson v. State, 473 S.W.3d 889, 897 (Tex. App. 2015) 
(“Evidence that the complainant was unconscious due to voluntary intoxication is sufficient to prove 
lack of consent.”); Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory Overview and Proposals for Reform, 44 
ARIZ. L. REV. 131, 186 (2002) (claiming that incapacity doctrine “protect[s] and vindicate[s] the right 
of all citizens to be free of nonconsensual sexual exploitation.”). Note that unconsciousness still does 
not stop some rapists from claiming that there was still consent in the moment. See Liam Stack, Light 
Sentence for Brock Turner in the Stanford Rape Case Draws Outrage, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/07/us/outrage-in-stanford-rape-case-over-dueling-statements-of-
victim-and-attackers-father.html. 
41.  They certainly also have restrictive effects for other populations. See Kate Sutherland, From 
Jailbird to Jailbait: Age of Consent Laws and the Construction of Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY 
J. WOMEN & L. 313, 332 (2003) (noting that age of consent laws construct sexualities in a way to 
comport with “particular societal or parental values”). 
42.  See Denno, supra note 35, at 343 (“According to some advocates for the mentally retarded, 
these rules constitute legally enforced celibacy for mentally retarded persons . . . .”); Elizabeth Hill, 
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In situations when a person has, but subsequently loses capacity, the 
law provides a tool for prospective decision-making: the advance directive. 
The next section examines the advance directive, its legal status, and how it 
has been implemented in other decision-making domains. 
B. Advance Directives 
An advance directive is a legal device that permits an individual to 
make decisions in advance or to delegate decision-making authority in 
advance of incapacity. There are two general types of advance directives. 
The first is an instructional directive, which sets out particular decisions in 
advance.43 The most famous and ancient form of instructional directive is 
the last will and testament, which sets forth decisions about distribution of 
property at death.44 Instructional directives in the health-care arena are of 
more recent vintage, traceable to a law review article penned in 1969 by 
Luis Kutner, an Illinois attorney.45 The living will specifies treatment 
decisions one might desire in a particular medical situation.46 For example, 
one might prospectively refuse a feeding tube or other invasive medical 
treatment if one ends up in a persistent vegetative state.47 The most recent 
form of instructional directive is the “physician order for life sustaining 
treatment” (POLST), which incorporates medical treatment preferences 
into doctor’s orders and medical charts for easier implementation.48 
 
Note, We’ll Always Have Shady Pines: Surrogate Decision-Making Tools for Preserving Sexual 
Autonomy in Elderly Nursing Home Residents, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 469, 476–83 (2014) 
(discussing the barriers to sexual expression in nursing homes). 
43.  See T.P. Gallanis, Write and Wrong: Rethinking the Way We Communicate Health-Care 
Decisions, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1015, 1018 (1999) (“[I]nstructional directives allow people to put their 
wishes into writing for future reference.”) (emphasis omitted). 
44.  See Gerry W. Beyer, The Will Execution Ceremony—History, Significance, and Strategies, 
29 S. TEX. L. REV. 413, 415–19 (1988) (discussing the history of wills in the Bible, ancient Egypt, 
Roman times, and England). 
45.  See Luis Kutner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539 
(1969); Melvin I. Urofsky, Leaving the Door Ajar: The Supreme Court and Assisted Suicide, 32 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 313, 319 (1998) (“An Illinois attorney, Luis Kutner, is given credit for proposing a 
formal advance directive in 1969.”). For a comparative historical perspective on the rise of health care 
advance directives, see Alfred Simon, Historical Review of Advance Directives, in ADVANCE 
DIRECTIVES 3, 6–11 (Peter Lack et. al eds., 2014) [hereinafter ADVANCE DIRECTIVES]. 
46.  See Susan J. Nanovic, The Living Will: Preservation of the Right-to-Die Demands Clarity 
and Consistency, 95 DICK. L. REV. 209, 210 (1990) (“A living will, also called an advanced directive, 
documents a person’s treatment preferences when, after certain triggering conditions have occurred, 
that person is unable to communicate these preferences.”). 
47.  See Schindler v. Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (relating the case of 
Terri Schiavo, who was in a persistent vegetative state for ten years, being kept alive with feeding 
tubes). 
48.  See Robert C. Anderson, Physician Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment (POLST): 
Breathing New Life into End-of-Life Care Planning, 259 ELDER L. ADVISORY 1 (2012) (describing and 
advocating for POLST). But see Stanley A. Terman, It Isn’t Easy Being Pink: Potential Problems with 
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Instructional directives fall into two general categories. First, these 
directives can be permissive in that they grant consent in advance to certain 
actions that would otherwise be impermissible.49 For example, informed 
consent forms signed in advance of surgery give permission to the surgeon 
to manipulate one’s body while unconscious in a particular way to promote 
health.50 Second, instructional directives can be restrictive in that they 
specifically do not grant consent in advance to certain actions. Restrictive 
advance directives are necessary in situations where there is a default rule 
in favor of action. For example, physicians operate against a background 
rule that they should perform medical interventions that promote life and 
health, unless a patient exercises a right to refuse treatment.51 A restrictive 
instructional directive, such as a do-not-resuscitate order, is one way to 
overcome this default in favor of action.52 
The second type of advance directive is the proxy directive, which sets 
out a particular surrogate decision-maker in advance.53 The most common 
type of proxy directive is the power of attorney, in which a person (the 
principal) authorizes another person (the agent) to act on her behalf.54 
Traditionally, the agency relationship ended at the incapacity of the 
principal.55 In the 1950s, however, power-of-attorney statutes were 
 
POLST Paradigm Forms, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 177 (2013) (considering philosophical and practical 
objections to POLST). 
49.  See DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE 176–82 (2012) (describing how 
consent can transform “bare wrongings” into permissible actions). 
50.  See Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617, 619 (Pa. 1997) (“It has long been the law in 
Pennsylvania that a physician must obtain informed consent from a patient before performing a surgical 
or operative procedure.”). 
51.  Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, physicians are required to 
treat patients who arrive at the hospital in medical distress, or to stabilize them before transferring them 
to another institution. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(b)(1) (West 2012). Further, the code of ethics followed 
by the medical profession requires action in such situations as well. See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND 
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS CURRENT OPINIONS WITH 
ANNOTATIONS § 8.11 (1997) (“The physician should . . . respond to the best of his or her ability in cases 
of emergency where first-aid treatment is essential.”). 
52.  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2991 (2013) (specifically noting that do-not-resuscitate 
orders must be respected and do not constitute suicide). Do-not-resuscitate orders differ from advance 
directives in that they originate from the physician, even if they might be based on preferences of the 
patient. See Robert S. Olick, On the Scope and Limits of Advance Directives and Prospective 
Autonomy, in ADVANCE DIRECTIVES, supra note 45, at 56–57. 
53.  See Gallanis, supra note 43, at 1019 (“[P]roxies allow people to appoint in writing surrogate 
decision-makers, typically spouses or close relatives, to act on their behalf.”). 
54.  See FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 35, at 19 (2d ed. 1914) 
(“[W]hen the [agent’s] authority is conferred by formal instrument in writing, it is said to be conferred 
by ‘letter of attorney,’ or, more commonly by ‘power of attorney.’”). 
55.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 122 (AM. LAW. INST. 1958) (“[T]he loss of 
capacity by the principal has the same effect upon the authority of the agent during the period of 
incapacity as has the principal’s death.”). The primary rationale for this is that the principal would not 
be able to monitor the agent’s actions. See Alexander M. Meiklejohn, Incompetent Principals, 
Competent Third Parties, and the Law of Agency, 61 IND. L.J. 115, 115–16 (1986) (“Agency is a 
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modified to make powers of attorney “durable,” so they would continue 
past the incapacity of the principal.56 After these reforms, the power of 
attorney became a useful tool for dealing with incapacity, as it allowed 
agents designated by the principal to manage the finances of a person once 
she acquired cognitive impairments.57 It was also a cheap and efficient 
alternative to guardianship.58 In the last forty years, all states have since 
extended the power of attorney to the health-care domain through the 
enactment of statutes that specifically authorize health-care proxies.59 
Instructional directives have the benefit of expressing exactly what the 
principal might want in a given circumstance.60 However, they do not take 
into account how changed circumstances might affect the principal’s 
decision if she were aware of them.61 The advantage of proxy directives is 
that they give authority to an agent to take account of those changed 
circumstances in order to arrive at a better choice, either with respect to the 
principal’s likely wishes or best interests.62 Their main drawback is that 
selecting an agent may be difficult, and agents might lack fidelity to the 
wishes of the principal who selected them.63 As a result of these drawbacks, 
some advocate the use of hybrid directives, which designate a proxy 
decision-maker but also provide written guidance about the principal’s 
beliefs in varying levels of mandatory language.64 In the financial domain, 
the trust could be seen as a type of hybrid directive. The trustee is the 
relevant agent, who manages the money that forms the corpus of the trust 
 
consensual relation; it is premised on the principal’s ability to understand and either approve or 
disapprove of the agent’s acts.”). 
56.  See Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney’s Place in the Family of Fiduciary 
Relationships, 36 GA. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2001) (surveying the history of durable power of attorney 
statutes). 
57.  See id. at 12–14. 
58.  See Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers as an Alternative to Guardianship: Lessons We Have 
Learned, 37 STETSON L. REV. 7, 9 (2007). 
59.  See Alicia R. Ouellette, When Vitalism Is Dead Wrong: The Discrimination Against and 
Torture of Incompetent Patients by Compulsory Life-Sustaining Treatment, 79 IND. L.J. 1, 3 n.7 (2004) 
(compiling the relevant statutes). 
60.  NANCY M. P. KING, MAKING SENSE OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 129 (1996) (noting that the 
“combination of position statements and lists of preferences and choices can paint powerful, clear, and 
compelling portraits of patients and their treatment decisions”). 
61.  See id. at 128 (“Anticipation of every contingency is impossible. There will always arise 
circumstances and decisions not directly addressed by a directive.”). 
62.  See id. at 137 (noting that with a proxy directive “decisions can be made concurrently rather 
than prospectively, by someone who can see the situation . . .”). 
63.  See id. at 137–39. 
64.  See Gallanis, supra note 43, at 1019 (“[C]ombined directives contain both instructional and 
delegational elements; they name a health-care proxy but also explain the patient’s wishes, usually 
about the application of life-sustaining treatment.”). 
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with varying levels of discretion about how to invest or distribute it.65 In 
the health-care domain, instructional elements are meant to provide the 
proxy decision-maker with information about the principal’s values, 
without necessarily mandating an outcome.66 
The right to prospective decision-making embodied in advance 
directives does not appear to be protected by the Constitution. The 
Supreme Court notably dodged the issue when deciding Cruzan v. Missouri 
Department of Health, a landmark case that dealt with state restrictions on 
the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.67 Despite this constitutional 
uncertainty, advance directives now stand on firm legal ground. All states 
have enacted statutes that recognize advance directives in a variety of 
decision-making domains.68 In addition to this statutory authorization, 
legislatures have passed a variety of laws that incentivize the creation of 
advance directives.69 Finally, many states allow for remedies if advance 
directives are not followed in either the health-care70 or financial 
domains.71 
 
65.  See Deborah S. Gordon, Trusting Trust, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 497, 503–06 (2015) (describing 
how the creation of trusts must balance the settlor’s instructional directives with flexibility for the 
trustee to address changed circumstances). 
66.  See Leslie Pickering Francis, Decisionmaking at the End of Life: Patients with Alzheimer’s 
or Other Dementias, 35 GA. L. REV. 539, 553 (2001). 
67.  See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990); id. at 287 n.12 (“We are 
not faced in this case with the question whether a State might be required to defer to the decision of a 
surrogate if competent and probative evidence established that the patient herself had expressed a desire 
that the decision to terminate life-sustaining treatment be made for her by that individual.”). The New 
Jersey Supreme Court, however, did explicitly recognize the ability of individuals to act through 
surrogates in another landmark case. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976). There may also be 
some constitutional support for the will as an advance directive, as the Supreme Court has come close 
to recognizing something of a right to transmit wealth at death. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 
(1987). 
68.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, DON. TRANS. § 33.1 Stat. Note (AM. LAW. INST. 
1992) (listing the wills statutes of all fifty states); Ouelette, supra note 59 (compiling health care 
advance directive statutes in all fifty states). 
69.  The Federal Patient Self-Determination Act requires various types of health institutions to 
provide patients with information about advance directives. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 4206, 4751, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-115 to-117, 1388-204 to-206 (codified 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Edward J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits of Advance 
Directives: A History and Assessment of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
249, 251–62 (1997) (discussing the history of the Act and its goals). The Act has been subject to 
criticism, however, for failing to meet its goals. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, The Maladaptation of 
Miranda to Advance Directives: A Critique of the Implementation of the Patient Self-Determination 
Act, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 139, 156 (1999) (critiquing the Act on empirical and theoretical grounds). 
70.  Patients’ legal representatives may seek injunctive relief to force physicians to comply with 
the stated wishes of the person who lacks legal capacity. See, e.g., In re Tavel, 661 A.2d 1061, 1068–69 
(Del. 1995) (ordering a feeding tube should be removed as it was consistent with the incapacitated 
person’s prior wishes). In addition, physicians who do not honor directives may open themselves to tort 
liability in a variety of forms. See Holly Fernandez Lynch et. al., Compliance with Advance Directives 
Wrongful Living and Tort Law Incentives, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 139–142 (2008). 
71.  Some states have passed laws requiring individuals or institutions to accept the authority 
wielded by an attorney-in-fact or face liability. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 30-5-9-9 (West 2009) 
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Thus, we have progressed from a time when advance directives did not 
even cover situations of incapacity to a point when they do so in a variety 
of decision-making domains. Despite this historical arc, scholars have not 
contemplated the extension of prospective decision-making to the realm of 
sexual decision-making. The next section describes sexual advance 
directives and how they may be of particular import to the population of 
people with persistent acquired incapacities in long-term care institutions. 
C. Persistent Incapacity and the Institutional Context 
Sexual advance directives would apply the traditional legal device of 
advance directives to the novel decision-making domain of sexuality. They 
would permit individuals either to consent in advance to specific sexual 
acts or to empower agents to make certain sexual consent decisions at a 
point in the future when the principal lacked capacity to consent to sex. As 
a legal matter, the sexual advance directive would fit into tort or criminal 
law as an essential element of a consent defense to sexual assault or 
battery.72 
There are a variety of contexts in which sexual advance directives 
might apply.73 This Article focuses only on sexual advance directives in the 
context of persistent acquired incapacity, most commonly caused by 
conditions such as Alzheimer’s Disease, dementia, or stroke. This is the 
traditional context for advance planning, in which one uses a period of 
legal capacity to prepare for an impending extended period of legal 
incapacity.74 In addition, the Article focuses only on the use of sexual 
advance directives in the context of institutional care, such as assisted-
 
(requiring treble damages and attorney’s fees); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32A-41 (2015) (requiring only 
attorney’s fees). Most states couple this with freeing financial institutions from liability for relying on 
power of attorney. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-1A-119 (LexisNexis Supp. 2015); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 45/2-8 (West 2007 & Supp. 2016). See also Whitton, supra note 58, at 40–47 (describing the 
statutory schemes in many states). 
72.  See infra Part III (discussing the elements of such a defense). 
73.  At the outset, two forms of legal incapacity are left untouched by sexual advance directives. 
Those with persistent lifelong conditions that can deprive one of legal capacity, such as Down 
Syndrome, and minors, who have not yet attained legal capacity due to age, cannot employ sexual 
advance directives as they lack the period of legal capacity needed to execute them. 
74.  The Article does not address situations of temporary incapacity, such as those described in 
the introductory example. While sexual advance directives might prove useful in this context, it is 
sufficiently distinct from persistent incapacity to warrant its own separate analysis. For example, the 
motivation to pursue sexual advance directives for temporary unconsciousness or intoxication is less 
clear than with persistent incapacity. The State would likely not pursue prosecutions if the individual 
who had sexual contact while impaired did not report it, and the case would be difficult to pursue in any 
case if the victim refused to cooperate because she did not perceive harm or lack of consent. Further, 
temporary forms of incapacity still permit one to have sex while not temporarily impaired, so the law’s 
restrictive force does not have such a severe effect on sexual expression. Thus, while this Article draws 
no firm conclusions on the utility of sexual advance directives for temporary incapacity, I am skeptical 
that they will bring the same net benefits as in the context considered here. 
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living facilities, nursing homes, and continuing-care retirement 
communities.75 Advance directives typically require a third party to oversee 
their use, such as the medical profession in the case of health care advance 
directives. Long-term care institutions are best equipped to perform this 
role here. Thus, the Article does not address the use of sexual advance 
directives outside of institutions where there is no possibility of third-party 
oversight.76 
There are several reasons for the dual focus on persistent acquired 
incapacity and institutional care. First, the aging of the population makes 
the legal implications of persistent forms of incapacity a pressing social 
issue. By 2050, the population over sixty-five is projected to be greater 
than 83.7 million, almost double its size from 2012.77 With this shift, a 
larger proportion of the population will be living for significant periods of 
time with chronic conditions that cause cognitive impairments.78 In 
addition, many of those with cognitive impairments will be living in long-
term care institutions, increasing the importance of addressing the 
regulatory regimes that govern this space.79 There is strong motivation for 
people to pursue sexual advance planning in cases of persistent incapacity 
and institutional care, given the extended time that individuals may lack 
legal capacity and the lack of control over intimate affairs that individuals 
may experience in residential institutions. In fact, such planning is already 
happening informally in some instances.80 
Second, the stakes for sexual expression are clearly significant with 
persistent incapacity. Adults remain sexually active well into old age, as the 
high rates of sexually transmitted diseases among this population 
 
75.  See Jon Pynoos et. al., Aging in Place, Housing, and the Law, 16 ELDER L.J. 77, 99–104 
(2008) (discussing the various housing options for seniors). 
76.  Outside of institutions, there is less of a need for sexual advance directives. The incapacity 
doctrines that govern sexuality have less regulatory force in the community, as there is neither 
institutional worry about legal liability nor enforcement by institutional staff. In addition, without 
institutional oversight, there is no readily available third party to prevent sexual abuse, creating 
significant practical barriers to implementation. 
77.  See JENNIFER M. ORTMAN ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AN AGING NATION: THE OLDER 
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2014). 
78.  See GEORGE P. SMITH, II., LEGAL AND HEALTHCARE ETHICS FOR THE ELDERLY 9 (1996) 
(“[A]s life is extended and death occurs at older ages, individuals are more likely to spend greater time 
in disabled or severely restricted states with mental impairment before they die.”). 
79.  See Ann Christine Frankowski & Leanne J. Clark, Sexuality and Intimacy in Assisted Living: 
Residents’ Perspectives and Experiences, 6 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y 25, 26–27 (2009) 
(discussing studies estimating the level of cognitive impairment among assisted living facilities as 
varying between 14% to 70%); Andrew Casta-Kaufteil, Comment, The Old & the Restless: Mediating 
Rights to Intimacy for Nursing Home Residents with Cognitive Impairments, 8 J. MED. & L. 69, 70 
(2004) (noting the high proportion of nursing home residents with Alzheimer’s Disease). 
80.  See Lisa Brodoff, Planning for Alzheimer’s Disease with Mental Health Advance Directives, 
17 ELDER L.J. 239, 279–86 (2010) (discussing life planning for Alzheimer’s Disease, including around 
intimate relationships). 
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demonstrate.81 Further, these sexual desires persist even for older adults 
with cognitive impairments.82 Sexual disinhibition is actually a feature of 
some medical conditions, leading to increased sexual behaviors in some 
cases.83 Despite these continued desires, the current “nature-and-
consequences” test for sexual consent capacity can effectively create a total 
bar on the sexual lives of people with persistent cognitive impairments.84 
This legal rule has actual regulatory force for those living in institutions, as 
it leads to sexually restrictive policies derived from worries about legal 
liability.85 In addition, the rule has expressive force, helping to construct 
 
81.  See Stacy Tessler Lindau et al., A Study of Sexuality and Health Among Older Adults in the 
United States, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 762, 762 (2007) (noting that a majority of those aged 65–74 and a 
significant minority of those aged 75–85 were still having sex); Alexander Warso, Note, Something 
Catchy: Nursing Home Liability in the Senior Sexually Transmitted Disease Epidemic, 22 ELDER L.J. 
491, 500–01 (2015) (discussing the problem of sexually transmitted diseases among older adults in 
nursing homes). As people age, however, the sexual contact at issue becomes less focused on genitals. 
See Ramzi R. Hajjar & Hosam K. Kamel, Sex and the Nursing Home, 19 CLINICS GERIATRIC IN MED. 
575, 576 (2003). In addition, sexual expression may be somewhat gendered. See Carole Archibald, 
Sexuality, Dementia, and Residential Care: Managers Report and Response, 6 HEALTH & SOC. CARE 
COMMUNITY 95, 97–98 (1998) (noting that much of the expressed sexual desire among residents with 
dementia was from male residents towards female staff). 
82.  See, e.g., Melinda Henneberger, An Affair to Remember, SLATE (June 10, 2008), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/family/2008/06/an_affair_to_remember.html (telling the story of a 
ninety-five-year old man and eighty-two-year old woman, both with cognitive impairments, who found 
romance in an assisted living facility before being separated by institutional staff and the family of the 
man). This is not to suggest that conditions such as Alzheimer’s Disease do not create barriers to 
sexuality in and of themselves. See Lore K. Wright, Affection and Sexuality in the Presence of 
Alzheimer’s Disease: A Longitudinal Study, 16 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 167, 168 (1998) (noting the 
lack of sexual expression in late stages of Alzheimer’s Disease); Helen D. Davies et al., ‘Til Death Do 
Us Part: Intimacy and Sexuality in the Marriages of Alzheimer’s Patients, 30 J. PSYCHOSOCIAL 
NURSING & MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 5, 5–10 (1992) (noting problems of memory, aggression, and 
erectile dysfunction). 
83.  See Leslie M. Lothstein et al., Risk Management and Treatment of Sexual Disinhibition in 
Geriatric Patients, 61 CONN. MED. 609, 609 (1997) (noting how sexual disinhibition is sometimes a 
consequence of neurological degenerative disorders); see also Tom Kitwood, The Experience of 
Dementia, 1 AGING & MENTAL HEALTH 13, 19 (1997) (“The heightened sexual desire that is felt by 
some people with dementia may be interpreted, at least in part, as a manifestation of this need [for 
comfort].”). 
84.  See Boni-Saenz, supra note 24, at 1204. 
85.  Liability can come in many forms. It may be imposed on institutions because they have a 
duty to care for those who are impaired. See, e.g., Ayuluk v. Red Oaks Assisted Living, Inc., 201 P.3d 
1183, 1190 (Alaska 2009) (adjudicating a vicarious liability claim for sexual assault of cognitively 
impaired patient by certified nurse’s assistant). The liability may also be regulatory. See JASON 
RODRIQUEZ, LABORS OF LOVE: NURSING HOMES AND THE STRUCTURES OF CARE WORK 39–44 (2014) 
(discussing the regulatory inspection process). Nursing homes respond to these threats of liability by 
restricting the sexual environments of residents. See Daniel Engber, Naughty Nursing Homes: Is It Time 
to Let the Elderly Have More Sex?, SLATE (Sept. 27, 2007), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/life/the_sex_issue/2007/09/naughty_nursing_homes.html (“Why are 
nursing-home administrators so queasy about sexual expression? They’re afraid of getting sued.”). 
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and limit the range of acceptable sexuality for people with cognitive 
impairments.86 
Third, maintaining the option of a sexual life is quite important as a 
legal and social matter. The Supreme Court has recognized some form of 
constitutionally protected sexual liberty interest under the Due Process 
Clause.87 The opportunity to pursue sexual expression finds strong support 
in moral philosophy as well.88 At a more basic level, sexual expression can 
be an important source of physical pleasure, personal meaning, and social 
connection.89 For older adults with cognitive impairments in particular, it 
helps with the depression and loneliness that often accompanies a diagnosis 
of Alzheimer’s Disease and an isolated social existence in an institutional 
context.90 In addition, it has positive effects for caregivers who are also 
sexual partners.91 
Finally, the planning process itself has the promise of clear desirable 
legal and social effects. Advance planning in the health care context has 
been shown to have positive effects on health-care treatment, and the same 
 
86.  See Boni-Saenz, supra note 24, at 1215. While potentially still affected by the expressive 
effects of legal doctrines, individuals living outside of institutions are not exposed to restrictive sexual 
policies that govern institutions and their residents. 
87.  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (recognizing some form of liberty interest 
of “adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”); Randy E. 
Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 21 
(2003) (arguing that Lawrence stands for a broad liberty-based sexual entitlement). But see Katherine 
M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2004) 
(arguing the sexual right does not extend beyond the bedroom). 
88.  See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 78 (2000) 
(considering the capability to pursue “opportunities for sexual satisfaction” as one of the central human 
capabilities necessary for a flourishing life). While Nussbaum categorizes sexual satisfaction as a part 
of the fundamental capability of bodily integrity, it also implicates other fundamental capabilities, such 
as senses, imagination, and thought; emotions, practical reason, affiliation, and play. See id. at 78–80; 
see also DON KULICK & JENS RYDSTRÖM, LONELINESS AND ITS OPPOSITE 286 (2015) (connecting a 
right to sex with the fundamental capabilities of bodily integrity, emotions, and affiliation). 
89.  See PAUL R. ABRAMSON & STEVEN D. PINKERTON, WITH PLEASURE: THOUGHTS ON THE 
NATURE OF HUMAN SEXUALITY 8–10 (rev. ed. 2002) (discussing the neurobiology of sexual pleasure); 
Rosalind Dixon, Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) Recast, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 277, 282–
83 (2008) (describing the value of sex to women in particular); Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, Sexual 
Expression and Intimacy Between Nursing Home Residents with Dementia: Balancing the Current 
Interests and Prior Values of Heterosexual and LGBT Residents, 21 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 
459, 464–66 (2012) (“Sexual expression and intimacy are basic human needs that last throughout life 
and have an enormous impact on quality of life.”); Casta-Kaufteil, supra note 79, at 72–74 (2004) 
(discussing the benefits of sexual expression). 
90.  See Sally M. Roach, Sexual Behaviour of Nursing Home Residents: Staff Perceptions and 
Responses, 48 J. ADVANCED NURSING 371, 378 (2004) (“Sexual sensations are among the last of the 
pleasure-giving biological processes to deteriorate, and are an enduring source of gratification at a time 
when pleasures are becoming fewer and fewer.”). 
91.  See Helen D. Davies et al., Sexuality and Intimacy in Alzheimer’s Patients and Their 
Partners, 16 SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 193, 195 (1998) (noting that sexual expression can be a source 
of support and mutual exchange among couples when one partner has cognitive impairments). 
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could hold true of long-term care.92 Planning provides a forum through 
which to process the various issues implicated in disability and death, 
allowing one to express important values or recognize important 
relationships.93 Finally, it makes decision-making easier for institutional 
staff and for loved ones, who benefit from guidance about the wishes of the 
person lacking legal capacity.94 
∗      ∗      ∗ 
Consent, capacity, and advance directives are all well-recognized 
features of the legal landscape, but they have not yet been combined in the 
sexual decision-making field. Sexual advance directives may be a way of 
preserving the sexual lives of those who wish to plan ahead while allowing 
institutions to facilitate such sexual activity without fear of liability if they 
do so in a competent way. Demographic changes require that we explore 
whether they are an improvement over the status quo, and under what 
circumstances they might be so. Part II examines when and whether sexual 
advance directives are theoretically attractive, while Part III delves into the 
practical problems with implementing them. 
II. SEX AND TEMPORAL SELVES 
This Part examines the philosophical basis for sexual advance 
directives. There is significant philosophical disagreement over whether 
advance directives generally should have legal effect. Section A describes 
these longstanding philosophical debates, which revolve around the proper 
moral treatment of two temporal selves—the “Time 1 self” and the “Time 2 
self.”95 The Time 1 self is the past self who executed the advance directive, 
either making prospective decisions or delegating authority to an agent to 
 
92.  See Arianne Brinkman-Stoppelenburg et al., The Effects of Advance Care Planning on End-
of-Life Care: A Systematic Review, 28 PALLIATIVE MED. 1000, 1020–21 (2014) (concluding that 
overall there was a positive effect on quality end-of-life care when advance planning had taken place). 
93.  See infra text accompanying notes 136–137; Mark Glover, A Therapeutic Jurisprudential 
Framework of Estate Planning, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 427, 450–55 (2012) (discussing the therapeutic 
effects of estate planning); see also Barbara A. Noah, In Denial: The Role of Law in Preparing for 
Death, 21 ELDER L.J. 1, 25–30 (2013) (arguing that advance directives are useful as they stimulate 
conversations about death); Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1958 (2000) 
(“Sexuality and reproduction are a part of life, for example, as are disability and aging.”). 
94.  See Naomi Cahn & Amy Ziettlow, “Making Things Fair”: An Empirical Study of How 
People Approach the Wealth Transmission System, 22 ELDER L.J. 325, 331 (2015) (noting how family 
members expressed appreciation for guidance and emotional understanding that estate planning 
provides). 
95.  This formulation strikes many as odd, as we are used to thinking of the self in terms of 
unities rather than heterogeneities. See JENNIFER RADDEN, DIVIDED MINDS AND SUCCESSIVE SELVES 
25–31 (1996). An alternative is “past self” and “present self.” 
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make those decisions in the future. The Time 2 self is the present self who 
lacks legal capacity and may be involved in the sexual contact that would 
otherwise be criminal or tortious without sexual consent. 
Section B argues that these debates may be diffused in many situations 
with respect to sexual advance directives. When the Time 1 and Time 2 
selves agree about the relevant sexual consent decision, there is a 
consensus of consents as between the Time 1 and Time 2 selves that makes 
legal recognition of sexual advance directives attractive from multiple 
philosophical perspectives. 
Section C explores how to deal with the problem of Time 2 silence, 
when the Time 2 self does not assert any particular opinion with respect to 
the sexual decision due to communicative impairment or unconsciousness. 
Prohibition of sexual advance directives in those contexts rests on the dual 
risks of unwanted sex and objectification. 
A. The Case For and Against Advance Directives 
Advance directives facilitate decision-making across time.96 At Time 1, 
an individual declares a decision or appoints a surrogate decision-maker. At 
Time 2 (typically when the individual lacks legal capacity to make 
decisions), the advance decision is executed or the decision of the surrogate 
decision-maker is implemented. 
Advance directives are also a form of self-binding.97 The most famous 
example of self-binding comes from Homer’s The Odyssey, in which 
Ulysses told the crew of his ship to stuff their ears with beeswax and to tie 
him to a mast so that he might hear the song of the Sirens. This binding was 
required because his self at Time 2, listening to the Sirens’ song, would be 
compelled to go to them, which would lead to his death.98 Ulysses’s tale 
brings out another important feature of self-binding, which is that it often 
requires third parties to enforce or implement it.99 
In everyday life, we informally bind ourselves in a variety of ways. For 
example, one might hand a smartphone over to a friend while eating dinner 
to prevent the checking of Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter during the 
 
96.  See KING, supra note 60, at 66 (“Part of what distinguishes humans from other animals is our 
ability to live in a way that encompasses not only present but also past and future.”). 
97.  See Rebecca S. Dresser, Ulysses and the Psychiatrists: A Legal and Policy Analysis of the 
Voluntary Commitment Contract, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 777, 784–92 (1982) (discussing different 
views of self-paternalism). 
98.  See THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER 189–90 (Richmond Lattimore trans. 1967). While the character 
is technically Odysseus, Ulysses (who appears in the Iliad) refers to the same hero and has been used 
interchangeably with Odysseus. 
99.  See Ronald Dworkin, Autonomy and the Demented Self, 64 MILBANK. Q. 4, 11–12 (1986) 
(discussing the case of a Jehovah’s Witness who pleads for a blood transfusion after signing a document 
requiring that it not be administered). 
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meal.100 The difference between informal self-binding and advance 
directives, however, is that the latter employ the coercive force of the law 
to authorize others to impose our past will on ourselves. Such self-binding 
measures, often called “Ulysses contracts,” are not legally enforceable in 
the absence of some cognitive defect, such as being under the influence of 
the Sirens’ song.101 Thus, if I demanded back my smartphone from my 
friend because I changed my mind and wanted to post a photograph of my 
food to Instagram, her refusal to return my property would not be legally 
permissible.102 
This non-enforcement of Ulysses contracts has a deep philosophical 
basis in Western thought. John Stuart Mill regarded liberty as exercising 
individual judgment, “where the judgment is grounded on actual, and 
especially on present, personal experience; not where it is formed 
antecedently to experience, and not suffered to be reversed even after 
experience has condemned it.”103 In other words, we are allowed to change 
our minds, particularly about personal matters.104 This presumption is 
reflected in various areas of the law. People may revoke their wills at any 
time before death by destroying them,105 and individuals may divorce 
without needing a legal reason for doing so.106 
 
100.  See Caitlin Dewey, Why You Should (Really, Seriously, Permanently) Stop Using Your 
Smartphone at Dinner, WASH. POST (July 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
intersect/wp/2014/07/14/why-you-should-really-seriously-permanently-stop-using-your-smartphone-at-
dinner/ (describing the many contexts in which people perhaps inappropriately use smartphones, 
including during sex, while driving, and in a house of worship). 
101.  See Dan W. Brock, Precommitment in Bioethics: Some Theoretical Issues, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
1805, 1808 (2003) (“Precommitments, as the term has come to be used in the literature, need not 
involve any other party in the way that promises or contracts do.”); Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing 
Rules on Oneself, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 357, 359 (1985) (“We have, then, a territory in which ‘private 
ordering’ is about all there is. We must devise rules for our own behavior that entail little or no reliance 
on the courts . . . because the courts refuse to extend us their jurisdiction.”). 
102.  Such an action would give rise to claim for conversion. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 222A (AM. LAW INST. 1965). Of course, it is unlikely that such a suit would occur, as the issue 
would likely be resolved informally. 
103.  JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 960 (William J. Ashley ed., 
Longmans, Green and Co. 1961) (emphasis added). Mill also rejected selling oneself into slavery for 
similar reasons. See id. 
104.  I confine my discussion here to personal self-binding, as this Article concerns sexual 
decision-making. Others have explored whether self-binding is a principle that underlies constitutional 
law and representative democracy. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN 
RATIONALITY, PRECOMITTMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 88–174 (2000). 
105.  See In re Estate of Stoker, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 529, 536 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“A will may be 
revoked where the testator executes a subsequent inconsistent will or where he or she burns or destroys 
the will.”); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-507 (amended 2010) (“A will or any part thereof is revoked . . . 
by performing a revocatory act on the will . . . .”). 
106.  See Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples and 
Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1676 n.41 (2011) (describing how no-fault divorce exists in 
all fifty states since New York enacted it in 2010). 
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Contracts can in fact bind us, but they take place in the context of an 
exchange whose purpose is to ensure that you cannot change your mind 
without suffering consequences.107 Even with contracts, however, courts 
are reluctant to allow individuals to bind themselves in certain ways. For 
example, courts are often unwilling to grant the remedy of specific 
performance, preferring instead to award monetary damages that do not 
infringe on an individual’s autonomy.108 Many courts even allow for a 
change of mind with personal contracts for surrogacy or adoption, 
rendering those types of contracts unenforceable.109 Given this 
philosophical and legal background, the theoretical basis for advance 
directives must come from somewhere else. Without it, it is difficult to 
justify favoring one temporal self over another.110 
This theoretical basis comes from the premise that the self at Time 2 
has a subordinate moral and legal status.111 In other words, Ulysses at Time 
 
107.  See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 483 (1988) 
(“Enforcement of contracts constitutes a social decision to protect the expectations of the promisee by 
curtailing the liberty of market participants to change their minds.”). Thus, a separate party is required. 
See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 99 (1984) (“The law recognizes . . . the 
promise—the commitment, the obligation, the impairment of one’s own freedom of choice—has a 
reciprocal quality and is to somebody, somebody else. The promise requires an addressee. One may not 
contract with himself.”). 
108.  See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 215–16 (1905) (rejecting specific performance in 
the employment context); Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 
763, 783 (1983) (“If the breaching promisor must continue to work or live with the other party and 
abide by the terms of a cooperative arrangement he now regrets, he will almost certainly find it more 
difficult to distance himself from his original values. He is likely, as a result, to feel more directly tied 
to the goals he has repudiated and to be more painfully reminded of their continuing influence in his 
life.”). 
109.  See Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Binding Future Selves, 75 LA. L. REV. 71, 86–91 (2014) 
(discussing how courts employ a “different selves” rationale to depart from traditional contract 
principles). 
110.  See Brock, supra note 101, at 1809 (arguing that there is no reason to favor the self at Time 
1 over self at Time 2); Thomas C. Schelling, Ethics, Law, and the Exercise of Self-Command, in 4 THE 
TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 75 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1983) (“Both selves can be 
authentic . . . . That both selves are authentic does not eliminate the issue. We must still decide which 
request to grant. But if both selves deserve recognition, the issue is distributive, not one of 
identification.”). 
111.  It is also premised on the assumption of continuous personal identity, or the idea that the 
self at Time 1 and the self at Time 2 are the same person. If the Time 1 and Time 2 selves were not the 
same person, then prospective decision-making would not be permissible, as individuals typically 
cannot bind others without their consent. See David DeGrazia, Advance Directives, Dementia, and “The 
Someone Else Problem”, 13 BIOETHICS 373, 374–79 (1999). Continuous personal identity has been 
justified by philosophers in a variety of ways. Some argue that it derives from the fact that the physical 
body is the same at Time 1 and Time 2. See, e.g., ERIC T. OLSON, THE HUMAN ANIMAL: PERSONAL 
IDENTITY WITHOUT PSYCHOLOGY (1997) (arguing for a biological approach to personal identity); 
Judith Jarvis Thomson, People and Their Bodies, in READING PARFIT 202 (Jonathan Dancy ed., 1997) 
(exploring the “physical criterion” of personal identity). Others believe that it is justified by the 
presence of psychological continuity between the self at Time 1 and Time 2. See, e.g., Sydney 
Shoemaker, Personal Identity: A Materialist’s Account, in PERSONAL IDENTITY 67, 89–91 (Sydney 
Shoemaker & Richard Swinburne eds., 1984). This is the view that has the most traction among 
Westerners. See Shaun Nichols & Michael Bruno, Intuitions about Personal Identity: An Empirical 
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2 was not someone to whom you should listen because he was under the 
influence of the mind-affecting tune of the Sirens, which would lead him to 
ruin. As a moral matter, we are sympathetic to his crew, who did not honor 
his request to be untied.112 In many cases of persistent incapacity, 
unconsciousness or degenerative conditions plainly deprive a person of the 
necessary mental faculties needed to make decisions. In those situations, an 
individual lacks legal capacity and is no longer a legally recognized subject 
in the relevant decision-making domain.113 Thus, we favor the self at Time 
1 (or the agent empowered by the self at Time 1) because that past self still 
had all her mental faculties when making the prospective decision, even if 
that past self might be distant in time. 
Several thinkers have put forth moral justifications for this legal state 
of affairs, but the most influential account has been that of Ronald 
Dworkin.114 His defense of advance directives is based on the nature of the 
 
Study, 23 PHIL. PSYCHOL. 293, 307 (2010). Still others take a more relational understanding of personal 
identity, seeing continuity through the relationships one has at Time 1 and Time 2. See Ho Mun Chan, 
Sharing Death and Dying: Advance Directives, Autonomy and the Family, 18 BIOETHICS 87, 99–100 
(2004); Søren Holm, Autonomy, Authenticity, or Best Interest: Everyday Decision-Making and Persons 
with Dementia, 4 MED. HEALTH CARE & PHIL. 153, 157 (2001) (“My maternal grandfather kept on 
being my maternal grandfather, even at a time when his dementia had developed so far that he could no 
longer recognise me as his grandson.”). 
 This assumption has come under fire from Derek Parfit, who argues that personal identity is more a 
matter of degree—i.e. how strong the connections are between the self at Time 1 and Time 2—rather 
than being an all-or-nothing affair. See Derek Parfit, REASONS AND PERSONS 205–12 (1984). Parfit also 
critiques the continuous personal identity assumption on instrumental grounds. See Derek Parfit, 
Personal Identity, 80 PHIL. REV. 3, 3 (1971) (“It makes people assume that the principle of self-interest 
is more rationally compelling than any moral principle. And it makes them more depressed by the 
thought of aging and of death.”). Despite the power of these critiques, the law has not been too troubled 
in assuming continuous personal identity. Without it, it would be difficult for the law to have regulatory 
force in managing relationships between people over time. See Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Legal 
Objectivity, 68 N.C. L. REV. 845, 854 (1990) (“The principle ‘one body, one person’ is a virtual 
necessity for the criminal justice system, for duties to honor one’s contracts, or to pay for one’s torts. 
Without unified personal identity, ‘new persons’ could spring fully formed into existence and 
legitimately could deny all family and financial obligations.”). But see generally Rebecca Dresser, 
Personal Identity and Punishment, 70 B.U. L. REV. 395 (1990) (arguing that criminal punishment can 
accommodate Parfit’s view of reductionist identity). 
112.  Some jurisdictions, using this logic, have enacted statutes allowing for psychiatric advance 
directives, which allow people with mental illness to agree in advance to forced hospitalization and 
medication. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-71 (2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-307 (2015); 
Justine A. Dunlap, Mental Health Advance Directives: Having One’s Say?, 89 KY. L.J. 327, 386 (2001) 
(advocating for advance directives for mental illness). These statutes, however, remain controversial. 
See Dresser, supra note 97, at 838–46 (noting the power imbalance between psychiatrists and their 
patients); Robert D. Miller, Advance Directives for Psychiatric Treatment: A View from the Trenches, 4 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 728, 737–44 (1998) (identifying several problems with these types of 
advance directives). 
113.  Capacity is not a global status. It is domain-specific, requiring “a determination of a 
particular person’s capacity to perform a particular decision-making task at a particular time and under 
specified conditions.” ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF 
SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 18 (1990). 
114.  See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 190–96 (1993); see also JEFF MCMAHAN, THE 
ETHICS OF KILLING: PROBLEMS AT THE MARGINS OF LIFE 502–03 (2002); Penney Lewis, Medical 
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different interests we might have in life and their relative importance. 
Specifically, he creates a dichotomy between critical interests and 
experiential interests. The former are those “[c]onvictions about what helps 
to make a life good” that reflect “critical judgments.”115 Critical interests 
are intertwined with our values, our life plan, and our narrative sense of 
self.116 They might include such things as having close relationships with 
loved ones, pursuing a meaningful career, or striving to be a person who 
tells the truth. We conclude what might be in our critical interests through 
the process of rational deliberation and reflection.117 
Experiential interests, in contrast, are things we do “because we like 
the experience of doing them.”118 This might be eating good food, listening 
to music, or taking a walk on a warm summer’s day. Dworkin’s argument, 
in a nutshell, is that critical interests should trump experiential interests.119 
Critical interests generated while one was still capable of deliberation and 
reflection should guide life during periods of incapacity when such 
deliberation and reflection are not possible.120 This is an exercise in 
controlling one’s own life narrative.121 
A number of theorists have challenged the presumptive legal 
enforceability of advance directives by attacking the moral and legal 
subordination of the self at Time 2. Rebecca Dresser has argued that it is 
not clear why the critical interests of the Time 1 self are relevant to a 
person who no longer has the capacity to understand or value those 
interests due to cognitive impairment.122 Instead, the focus should be on the 
objective welfare of the present self, even if those welfare interests are 
 
Treatment of Dementia Patients at the End of Life: Can the Law Accommodate the Personal Identity 
and Welfare Problems?, 13 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 219 (2006) (suggesting that not allowing a person to 
have some control over their future self would infringe on human rights). 
115.  DWORKIN, supra note 114, at 201–02. 
116.  See Ben A. Rich, Prospective Autonomy and Critical Interests: A Narrative Defense of the 
Moral Authority of Advance Directives, 6 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 138, 144–45 (1997). 
117.  DWORKIN, supra note 114. For an interesting defense of rational deliberation on important 
life matters, see generally HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS (1994). 
118.  DWORKIN, supra note 114, at 201. 
119.  Id. 
120.  See John K. Davis, The Concept of Precedent Autonomy, 16 BIOETHICS 114, 131–32 (2002) 
(arguing that one’s “most-informed,” “highest-order” preference should win out even if it is older 
because the latest preference does not necessarily reflect the highest-order preference). Agnieszka 
Jaworska has argued that many people with dementia are still capable of forming critical interests 
because they are capable of valuing. While many people with dementia lose memories of their early 
lives, they may still make decisions adhering to values that were formed as part of their own personal 
narrative or that reflect new commitments in life. See Agnieszka Jaworska, Respecting the Margins of 
Agency: Alzheimer’s Patients and the Capacity to Value, 28 PHIL & PUB. AFFAIRS 105, 116 (1999). 
121.  See MARYA SCHECTMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF SELVES 94–114 (1996) (describing the 
narrative view of self). 
122.  See Rebecca S. Dresser & John A. Robertson, Quality of Life and Non-Treatment Decisions 
for Incompetent Patients: A Critique of the Orthodox Approach, 17 J.L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 234, 
236 (1989). 
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comprised only of experiential ones.123 In the case of persistent incapacity, 
this is reinforced by the fact that there is no chance that the Time 1 self will 
reemerge, so the perspective of the Time 2 self should prevail.124 
Dresser’s views draw support from disability activists, who have 
argued that legal capacity is a disabling force in society.125 They argue that 
legal capacity is a human right, and a variety of laws empowering past 
selves or surrogate decision-makers should be reformulated to put the 
present self with cognitive impairments at the center of analysis.126 This 
leads to supportive modes of decision-making, in which caregivers and 
advisors attempt to facilitate the desires and decisions of the person with 
disabilities to the extent possible, rather than supplanting that person’s 
decision-making.127 Legal scholars have extended these insights, arguing 
for a reformulation of the legal standard for capacity to consent to sex as 
well.128 
The difference between the Dworkinian view and the views of his 
critics can be encapsulated in the oft-discussed story of Margo, first 
reported by a medical student named Andrew Firlik in an article nearly 
twenty-five years ago.129 Margo is a woman aged fifty-five with 
Alzheimer’s Disease. She enjoys several of her daily activities, including 
consuming peanut butter and jelly sandwiches with milk, reading mystery 
novels, listening to records, and attending an art therapy class.130 She 
experiences some of these activities differently than someone without 
 
123.  See Rebecca Dresser, Precommitment: A Misguided Strategy for Securing Death with 
Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1823, 1840–41 (2003). 
124.  See Rebecca Dresser, Missing Persons: Legal Perceptions of Incompetent Patients, 46 
RUTGERS L. REV. 609, 616 (1994) (arguing for looking at decision-making from the perspective of the 
incapacitated person). There are, of course, those who advocate a compromise view somewhere 
between Dworkin and Dresser. See, e.g., Alasdair R. Maclean, Advance Directives, Future Selves and 
Decision-Making, 14 MED. L. REV. 291, 313–20 (2006) (analogizing the past-present self relationship 
to the parent-child relationship, in which the parent has the authority to set some of the terms of the 
child’s life). 
125.  See Nandini Devi, Supported Decision-Making and Personal Autonomy for Persons with 
Intellectual Disabilities: Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 41 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 792, 799 (2013) (“Society must recognize that people with intellectual disabilities 
have their own desires, wills, and needs and are capable of making choices accordingly.”). 
126.  See Eilionóir Flynn & Anna Arstein-Kerslake, The Support Model of Legal Capacity: Fact, 
Fiction, or Fantasy?, 32 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 124, 127–30 (2014). 
127.  See Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative to 
Guardianship?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111, 1128–46 (2013) (assessing the potential of supported 
decision-making models). 
128.  See Boni-Saenz, supra note 24, at 1233 (“The law should recognize an individual who 
employs a supported decision-making network as having legal capacity on par with individuals who do 
not need such support.”); see also Joseph J. Fischel & Hilary R. O’Connell, Disabling Consent, or 
Reconstructing Sexual Autonomy, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 428, 487 (2016) (arguing for 
“sociopolitical accommodations—access, education, and assistance—to facilitate sex”). 
129.  Andrew D. Firlik, Margo’s Logo, 9 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 201, 201 (1991). Firlik shared his 
experiences visiting with her as part of a gerontology elective. See id. 
130.  See id. 
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Alzheimer’s might, as she does not seem to be reading her novel 
sequentially; each time she listens to a song it was as if she were listening 
to it for the first time; and she always paints the same picture of four soft 
rosy circles in art class.131 Notably though, Firlik declared the following: 
“Despite her illness, or maybe somehow because of it, Margo is undeniably 
one of the happiest people I have known.”132 
Suppose that Margo were to get severe pneumonia, which would lead 
to her death if she did not receive antibiotics. If Margo left an advance 
directive declaring that she should not be given any health-care treatment 
while suffering from Alzheimer’s Disease, Dworkin argues that the 
directive should be followed, leading to her death.133 This would be a 
fulfillment of her wishes about how to live out the end of her life, i.e. not in 
a cognitively diminished state. In contrast, Dresser and many disability 
activists see this as an affront to Margo’s humanity.134 In their view, she 
deserves quality healthcare treatment, and enforcing the advance directive 
would deny her present interests in continuing to live, to enjoy her daily 
activities, and to experience happiness.135 This debate presents compelling 
arguments on both sides, and it is unlikely to be resolved any time soon. 
If Margo had filled out a sexual advance directive, the debate would 
look similar, as sexuality implicates both important critical interests of 
concern to the self at Time 1 and experiential interests of concern to the 
self at Time 2. The experiential interests are perhaps more obvious given 
the importance of sexual expression to physical pleasure through bodily 
contact and sexual release.136 The critical interests encompass any way in 
which sex is important to one’s life plan. For example, people incorporate 
their sexual practices into their identities in a variety of ways.137 This could 
be represented by the identity of a heterosexual man who’s “got game” or a 
sexual minority, such as a lesbian, who understands her identity through the 
fact that she only has sex with women. Sexual acts might also be connected 
 
131.  See id. 
132.  Id. 
133.  See DWORKIN, supra note 114, at 226–27. 
134.  See Rebecca Dresser, Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy, 25 
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 32, 38 (1995) (“Their loss of higher-level intellectual capacities ought not to 
exclude people like Margo from the moral community nor from the law’s protective reach, even when 
the threats to their well-being emanate from their own former preferences.”). 
135.  See id. at 37. 
136.  See ABRAMSON & PINKERTON, supra note 89, at 8–10 (discussing the neurobiology of 
sexual pleasure); RAJA HALWANI, PHILOSOPHY OF LOVE, SEX, AND MARRIAGE 153–61 (2010) 
(discussing the subjective features of sexual pleasure). 
137.  See Gowri Ramachandran, Delineating the Heinous: Rape, Sex, and Self-Possession, 123 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 371, 386 (2013) (“Who one has sex with often signifies something important about 
one’s social identity. It communicates what one finds desirable, who one is desirable to, even 
sometimes what one thinks about gender, domestic labor, and children.”). 
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to critical interests through one’s sexual relationships with others.138 
Examples might include the maintenance of a monogamous sexuality for 
conservative Christians in marriage to the collection of a set of friends who 
participate in a BDSM community. 
B. The Consensus of Consents 
This Article does not endeavor to resolve this contentious and 
longstanding philosophical debate, as applied to sexuality or any other 
decision-making realm. There is, however, a way to diffuse the tension 
between these two views with respect to sexual advance directives. The 
debates over advance directives paint a picture of the Time 1 and Time 2 
selves in conflict, but it is quite possible that the two temporal selves’ 
interests will actually align in many situations. In other words, the Time 1 
self will provide prospective consent to sex, while the Time 2 self will 
token contemporaneous consent.139 When this occurs, there is a consensus 
of consents, and theorists from both sides of the philosophical divide would 
likely agree that sexual advance directives then serve important 
purposes.140 
In the example of Margo above, Dworkin imagines that she had filled 
out a restrictive health care advance directive, which was necessary since 
the facility in which she lived operated with a default of administering 
medical treatment to promote health and life.141 The conflict comes because 
Margo appears to be happy and engaged with the world, albeit in a 
diminished way. Based on this contextual evidence, one would imagine 
that Margo would desire to continue to exist if the choice could be put to 
her.142 Picture, however, that Margo had filled out an advance directive 
requesting antibiotic treatment were she to lose capacity and get 
pneumonia. In this case, there is no potential conflict between Time 1 
 
138.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 111 (1992) (noting that the sociable benefit of 
sex “refers to the use of sex to construct or reinforce relationships with other people, such as spouses or 
friends”). 
139.  While neither the prospective consent at Time 1 (because of lack of simultaneity with the 
sexual act) nor the token of consent at Time 2 (because of lack of capacity) constitutes a standard form 
of consent, I refer to both as consents for simplicity’s sake. 
140.  See Elysa R. Koppelman, Dementia and Dignity: Towards a New Method of Surrogate 
Decision-Making, 27 J. MED. & PHIL. 65, 82 (2002) (criticizing an exclusive focus on either the “then 
self” or the “now self”). These consensus situations also help to resolve the problem that the law often 
provides insufficient guidance in evaluating capacity, as health care professionals could rely on the joint 
“Yes” of the past and present selves. See Marshall B. Kapp, Evaluating Decision-Making Capacity in 
Older Individuals: Does the Law Give a Clue?, 4 LAWS 164, 165–66 (2015) (noting the lack of 
guidance the law provides to health care professionals). 
141.  Dresser, supra note 134, at 32. 
142.  See Ralf J. Jox, Revocation of Advance Directives, in ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 73, 83 
(discussing the practicalities of inferring preferences from behavior). 
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Margo and Time 2 Margo. In fact, such an advance directive would not 
even be necessary, given the default in favor of such routine treatment. No 
one would object to the administration of antibiotics in this case. 
Identifying the alignment of interests between the Time 1 and Time 2 
selves may be easier in the case of sexuality than in other areas in which 
advance directives are typically employed. In the case of Margo, we had to 
infer what her view of medical treatment might be, based on her activities 
and her generally happy mental state. If you asked her whether she wanted 
antibiotics or presented her with antibiotics to see if she would take them, it 
is not clear there would even be a coherent response. In contrast, Margo 
may actively seek out or avoid sexual contact, and that expressed 
preference is likely directly related to whatever experiential interests she 
might associate with that sexual experience. As noted earlier, people with 
dementia sometimes experience disinhibition of sexual behaviors.143 If 
Margo reached for the genitals of her husband unprompted every time he 
visited her, we can safely presume that she is tokening consent to some 
form of sexual contact. This is not to say that communications will 
necessarily be as straightforward as this in all cases.144 But sometimes they 
will, and this expressed preference is meaningful. 
The default rule is also important for determining whether there is a 
consensus of consents. In the current sexual consent regime, there is a legal 
baseline that sexual contact is impermissible unless it is consented to.145 
Thus, restrictive sexual advance directives are not necessary, as the 
baseline will legally prohibit such sexual acts anyway.146 What is at issue in 
 
143.  See Kitwood, supra note 83, at 19; Lothstein, supra note 83, at 609. 
144.  For example, suppose that Margo reached for her own genitals every time her husband 
entered the room. Whether or not this constitutes a token of consent to have her husband sexually touch 
her would require more information about her methods of communication and sexual engagement. It 
could represent a desire to masturbate in the presence of her husband only, without sexual touch by him, 
or it might be an initial part of a sexual script that she regularly employed with her husband that would 
lead up to sexual touch. Or it could be something else entirely. Each factual scenario will need to be 
considered on a case-by-case basis, which is the current methodology for assessing expressions of 
consent. I thank Professor Suzanne Kim for this example. 
145.  See WERTHEIMER, supra note 11, at 119 (“We start with the principle that it is morally and 
legally impermissible to engage in sexual relations without the other party’s consent.”). 
146.  Many scholars have suggested reforming the current sexual consent capacity regime to 
allow people with persistent cognitive impairments to have a sexual life. See, e.g., Boni-Saenz, supra 
note 24, at 1234–43 (proposing the cognition-plus test); Denno, supra note 35, at 355–59 (proposing a 
contextual approach). A strict Dworkinian would likely favor the strong enforcement of restrictive 
directives in such a regime, as it maintains narrative identity and supports critical interests. There are 
several reasons why such an analysis would be misguided. First, such a strong view of restrictive sexual 
advance directives runs counter to the explicit goal of these contextual tests, which is to avoid any hard-
and-fast prohibitive rules on sexual expression for people with disabilities. Second, such a view does 
not comport with the methodology of these tests, which is typically more contextual and holistic. Both 
restrictive and permissive sexual advance directives, however, could play an important evidentiary role. 
They might be useful in understanding the favored sexual behavior or relationships of the person with 
cognitive impairments, or in providing good evidence of whom the person with impairments trusted. 
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our current regime, then, are permissive sexual advance directives. Such 
directives prospectively set forth a decision to consent to sex or imbue 
another with decision-making authority to consent to sex in the future. As 
such, they are an expression of the self at Time 1 that sex is permissible, at 
least under certain circumstances, or that an agent is trusted to make that 
call. 
To make the consensus of consents concrete, consider several 
permutations of the case of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and her husband, 
John.147 The Justice stepped down from the bench in 2005 to help her 
husband move to an assisted living center, as he was suffering from 
Alzheimer’s Disease. His condition led him to forget his relationship with 
the Justice, and he developed a new romance with a woman in the facility. 
Justice O’Connor magnanimously approved of the new relationship, as she 
saw that it made John happy and fulfilled, whereas before he was 
depressed. Here, the Justice was acting as an informal agent in blessing a 
relationship that involved spending time together and holding hands. Now 
consider the following example: 
 
• John executed a sexual advance directive naming Sandra as his 
sexual agent, trusting her to do what was best for him when he lost 
capacity. Based on their behavior together, John and his new 
romantic partner show an interest in exploring more of a sexual 
relationship. Sandra, seeing how happy this new relationship 
makes him, consents on his behalf to some forms of sexual contact 
with this new woman. 
In this case, John has executed a proxy directive. Normally, the facility 
would likely prevent this type of sexual relationship from developing, 
fearing legal and regulatory liability.148 However, John at Time 1 and John 
at Time 2 are in agreement that the outcome should be sexual contact, 
given that Sandra consents as her husband’s sexual agent. Here, the 
advance directive is useful in actualizing the critical interests of the pre-
impairment self, as it allows John to recognize the importance of his 
relationship with his wife and his trust in her. But it is also important for 
promoting the experiential interests of the post-impairment self, by 
allowing John to have a sexual life and preventing the residential institution 
in which he resides from being subject to civil or criminal liability simply 
for permitting sex by residents. In other words, there is no conflict between 
the self at Time 1 and the self at Time 2, so there is coherence in 
 
147.  This narrative is adapted from Kate Zernike, Love in the Time of Dementia, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 18, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/weekinreview/18zernike.html. 
148.  See supra note 85. 
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preferences across time.149 The sexual advance directive is attractive from 
multiple philosophical perspectives in this case, and the traditional debate 
about advance directives is mooted. 
Things get more complicated, however, when there is disagreement 
between the Time 1 and Time 2 selves. Consider the following twist: 
 
• John executed a sexual advance directive in which he consented 
prospectively to intercourse with his wife Sandra in the event he 
lost legal capacity to consent to sex. His identity as Sandra’s 
spouse was important to him, and he wanted to make sure that the 
sexual relationship continued if Sandra wanted it. Sandra initiates 
sexual contact with John, but he does not remember his wife and 
pulls away from any sexual touch. 
In this case, John has executed an instructional directive. However, it 
seems clear that it should not have the legal effect of making this sexual 
contact permissible. There are two ways to justify this particular result. 
First, one might side with Dworkin’s critics in the philosophical debates 
over advance directives generally. There are immensely negative welfare 
effects to the imposition of unwanted sex, as the literature on rape has 
demonstrated.150 That experiential interest seems more important than any 
critical interest retained by a pre-impairment self in continued sexual 
contact. In order to protect the bodily integrity and self-determination of 
the individual with cognitive impairments, said individual must be able to 
prevent unwanted sex, even if he might not have the ability to affirmatively 
consent and even if there is a clear directive to the contrary.151 This 
conclusion is consistent with rejecting Dworkin’s hypothesized health care 
advance directive that would lead to Margo’s death. However, one need not 
take a side in these debates to resolve this particular situation. One could 
instead argue that one never loses the ability to not consent to sex, even if 
one might not be able to affirmatively consent. Thus, one retains a narrow 
legal capacity in the sexual decision-making domain, allowing for a partial 
 
149.  See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 
65–68 (1979) (discussing the problem of temporally inconsistent preferences). 
150.  See, e.g., Rebecca Campbell et al., An Ecological Model of the Impact of Sexual Assault on 
Women’s Mental Health, 10 TRAUMA VIOLENCE & ABUSE 225 (2009) (describing the long-term 
negative effects of rape); Lynne N. Henderson, Review Essay: What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 193 (1987–88) (describing rape as negation of existence); Robin L. West, 
Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 1448 (1993) 
(describing rape as “spiritual murder”). 
151.  See MICHAEL GILL, ALREADY DOING IT: INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND SEXUAL AGENCY 
32–38 (2015) (noting the high levels of sexual abuse of people with cognitive impairments and the 
importance of respecting this population as being capable of sexual agency). 
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revocation of the advance directive with respect to that particular 
situation.152 
In either formulation, the importance of consent both at Time 1 and at 
Time 2 is clear. The Time 1 consent ensures that continued sexual contact 
comports with the values and life plans of the individual, considered as a 
whole. The Time 2 consent ensures that the sexual contact is actually 
desired in the moment. It also respects the bodily integrity of the Time 2 
self. Thus, there must exist a consensus of consents before a sexual 
advance directive should be legally enforceable. The next section examines 
situations in which it might be difficult to obtain Time 2 consent and how 
this threatens the consensus of consents. 
C. The Problem of Silence 
The most complex situation is one in which the self at Time 1 consents 
prospectively to sexual contact but the Time 2 self is silent. Consider the 
following cases: 
 
• Alexandra, a sixty-year-old woman, executes a sexual advance 
directive designating her daughter, Becky, as her agent. Alexandra 
has a stroke, which leaves her mentally aware but unable to 
communicate. She is admitted to a nursing home. Several men, 
who had shown romantic interest in Alexandra before the stroke, 
visit her. The nursing home informs Becky of this, and Becky 
consents to her mother having sexual contact with one of the male 
visitors who Becky believes her mother truly liked. 
• Carlos, a law school student, is about to undergo a complicated 
surgical procedure. He executes a sexual advance directive in 
which he consents prospectively to sex with his long-term 
girlfriend, up to and including intercourse. The surgery leaves him 
in a persistent coma, unaware of his surroundings. 
These cases help us to determine what the legal implications of silence 
should be for sexual advance directives.153 In Alexandra’s case, the self at 
Time 2 lacks capacity not because of cognitive impairment but because of a 
communicative impairment.154 Establishing whether there is in fact a 
 
152.  See People v. Thompson, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (“Even a severely 
disabled person may object to a sexual touching because he or she finds it unpleasant—a ‘bad touch’; 
this does not necessarily mean he or she could give legal consent.”). 
153.  See Peter Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 2–5 (1995) (discussing 
the legal importance of silence in various contexts). 
154.  See FEINBERG, supra note 34, at 316–17. 
1 BONI-SAENZ 1-47 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2016  2:32 PM 
2016] Sexual Advance Directives 31 
consensus of consents is quite difficult here. We know that Becky has 
consented to sexual contact on her mother’s behalf, but we lack the 
information to know whether we are in a situation of consensus or 
dissensus as between the two temporal selves. Alexandra may indeed want 
sexual contact, but we cannot peer inside her mind and know. This makes 
whether or not to honor the sexual advance directive a policy question that 
involves an analysis of the risk of unwanted sex.155 We could leave this 
analysis to Becky as Alexandra’s designated agent, but she is not any better 
situated to peer into Alexandra’s mind. Given the significant risks of 
unwanted sex here, sexual advance directives should be prohibited in this 
situation.156 
Carlos’s case presents a twist on the example from the Introduction, 
although the cause of the unconsciousness is different, and the 
incapacitating condition is persistent.157 Similar to Alexandra’s case, we 
also have no input from the self at Time 2 about what he wants. In practice, 
it may be difficult in some cases to distinguish whether and to what degree 
an individual retains consciousness of the outside world, in which case the 
risks described in Alexandra’s case may apply to a larger set of silence 
cases. Assuming we do accurately know Carlos’s condition, his case differs 
from Alexandra’s situation in that the sex will not be subjectively felt as 
either wanted or unwanted at the moment of the sexual act.158 This means 
the risk to the self at Time 2 of experiencing unwanted sex and all that it 
entails is not present. The closest analogy one could draw is to the practice 
of having patients sign an informed-consent form authorizing surgery while 
unconscious.159 The self at Time 2 in that scenario would also not 
experience the trauma of unwanted physical intrusion at the moment of the 
intrusion, and that informed consent form would protect the surgeon from 
criminal or tort lawsuits.160 
There are several reasons to treat the sexual advance directive here 
differently from the informed consent form for surgery. First, in the case of 
surgery, the incapacity is only temporary, so the Time 1 self will reemerge 
 
155.  See People v. Dancy, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 898, 911 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (examining the risk of 
misinterpreted consent in the case of sex during temporary unconsciousness); Catherine L. Carpenter, 
On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 353 
(2003) (analyzing statutory rape in terms of risk to the defendant). 
156.  The risks may be even greater here, as rape threatens the personhood of the victim, which 
may already be in a fragile state given the inability to communicate. See ANN J. CAHILL, RETHINKING 
RAPE 133 (2001) (discussing the personhood threats). 
157.  See supra note 1. 
158.  See Hilary Young, R. v. A. (J.) and the Risks of Advance Consent to Unconscious Sex, 14 
CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 273, 285–86 (2010) (discussing the different forms of unconsciousness and their 
effect on perception). 
159.  See supra note 50. 
160.  See supra note 52. 
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to enjoy the benefits of the procedure.161 Here, there is no Time 1 self who 
will reemerge. Second, there are presumably clear benefits to the surgery, 
and a state of unconsciousness is necessary to perform it. In this case, 
unconsciousness is not a prerequisite to sexual contact and may in fact 
inhibit it. Third, and perhaps most importantly, sexual contact with a 
persistently unconscious person presents serious risks of objectification, or 
treating “as an object what is really not an object, what is, in fact, a human 
being.”162 The lack of interaction from the person with impairments 
highlights the likelihood that they are being treated as an object.163 Such 
objectification may also serve to perpetuate harmful sexual and gender 
dynamics as well.164 This is an independent ground on which recognizing 
sexual advance directives would be morally problematic in this context. 
Thus, unless significant actual benefits to the unconscious person can 
somehow be shown, sexual advance directives should not have legal effect 
in either of the cases of Time 2 silence. 
∗      ∗      ∗ 
This Part established a necessary condition for the legal recognition of 
sexual advance directives: the consensus of consents. While the prospective 
consent of the Time 1 self and the contemporaneous token of consent of the 
Time 2 self diffuse the traditional debate over the legal recognition of 
advance directives, there remain practical problems of implementation. The 
next Part addresses how sexual advance directives would work on the 
ground. 
 
161.  This is similar to the reasoning at common law for why lunatics, whose condition was 
temporary, should be treated differently from idiots, whose condition was persistent. See Louise 
Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 
1, 16–18 (1990) (describing how the Crown was limited in its control over the lunatic’s property 
because if the lunatic regained capacity, her property would have to be returned to her). 
162.  See Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 249, 257 (1995) (emphasis 
omitted). 
163.  Several of the notions Nussbaum describes as being involved in objectification are 
implicated by this lack of interaction, such as instrumentality (“The objectifier treats the object as a tool 
of his or her purposes”), denial of autonomy (“The objectifier treats the object as lacking in autonomy 
and self-determination”), inertness (“The objectifier treats the object as lacking in agency, and perhaps 
also in activity”), and denial of subjectivity (The objectifier treats the object as something whose 
experience and feelings (if any) need not be taken into account”). Id. 
164.  See id. at 289–90 (noting that “treatment of human beings as tools of the purposes of 
another” is always morally objectionable unless it takes place in the context of respect for the humanity 
of the person); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 124 (1989) 
(describing the negative effects of sexual objectification on women in particular). But see Patricia 
Marino, The Ethics of Sexual Objectification: Autonomy and Consent, 51 INQUIRY 345, 355–61 (2008) 
(arguing that objectification can be morally permissible if consented to and if the background 
conditions of equality exist). 
1 BONI-SAENZ 1-47 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/31/2016  2:32 PM 
2016] Sexual Advance Directives 33 
III. IMPLEMENTING SEXUAL ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
With the theoretical basis of sexual advance directives identified, what 
remains is a consideration of the practical difficulties of implementing 
them. The sexual advance directive is addressed to the non-consent element 
of the crime of sexual assault and the tort of battery. It would thus play a 
role in criminal prosecutions and tort lawsuits that involved sexual contact 
with a person who has persistent cognitive impairments residing in a long-
term care institution. Normally a consent defense would not be possible 
because a person who lacks capacity cannot consent to sex. However, this 
Article proposes that a defendant in such an action be able to assert a 
defense of consent composed of two elements: prospective consent in the 
form of a written sexual advance directive (actualized by a sexual agent in 
the present, if a proxy directive is employed), and contemporaneous 
consent in the form of an affirmative token of consent. This is a more 
complex formulation for consent than is otherwise required, but this 
complexity is demanded by the nature of the situation involved. These 
elements are aimed at ensuring that there is a consensus of consents. 
Section A examines how to ensure this by describing the legal machinery 
surrounding the consents at Time 1 and Time 2. 
The consensus of consents and the consent defense that it represents in 
a criminal or tort trial, however, are not the entire picture. There are 
potential problems with each of the consents given at Time 1 and Time 2. 
The prospective consent at Time 1 is given by someone who has their full 
mental faculties, but it is also given without full knowledge of the sexual 
facts in the moment.165 The token of consent at Time 2 is good for 
assessing sexual desire, but it is not a consent that necessarily comes from a 
deliberation of the nature and consequences of the sexual act. A sexual 
agent empowered at Time 1 and assessing the situation at Time 2 is 
qualified to judge the sexual situation, but this agent may not be acting with 
loyalty and care in their proxy decision-making.166 
This points to a need for an additional layer of practical and legal 
safeguards to ensure that sexual advance directives do not lead to objective 
harm. Thus, sexual advance directives must be implemented in the context 
of a long-term care institution, which fills the role of third-party oversight 
that is present for advance directives in other contexts. In addition, sexual 
 
165.  See DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS 101–08 (2006) (discussing how people 
fail to predict accurately their future emotional states); Marie-Jo Thiel, Personal Capacity to Anticipate 
Future Illness and Treatment Preferences, in ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 17, 24–26 (discussing the 
difficulties of predicting one’s circumstances in the future, especially when illness is involved). 
166.  See Nina A. Kohn, Matched Preferences and Values: A New Approach to Selecting Legal 
Surrogates, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 399, 408–13 (2015) (noting a “congruence problem” between 
individuals and their proxies’ preferences). 
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agents authorized under a proxy sexual advance directive must adhere to 
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in making proxy sexual decisions. 
Section B examines these issues. 
A. Ensuring the Consensus of Consents 
The permissibility of sexual advance directives is premised on the 
consensus of consents that exists between the Time 1 and Time 2 selves. 
Thus, in order for sexual advance directives to work in practice, there must 
be a high degree of certainty that the consents at Time 1 and Time 2 are 
authentic and voluntary. That is, we want to be reasonably sure that the 
sexual advance directive is actually a reflection of the views of the person 
who created it, and we want to be reasonably certain that the consent given 
at the time of the sexual act reflects accurately the person’s sexual desires. 
At Time 1, this involves ensuring that the execution of the sexual advance 
directive is a sound process. At Time 2, this involves ensuring that there is 
a valid capacity to communicate sexual desires and an actual affirmative 
expression of consent. As many people with cognitive impairments reside 
in institutions, this may also entail a privacy tradeoff, as some form of 
institutional monitoring may be required for people with severe 
impairments to ensure Time 2 consent. 
1. Prospective Consent, Execution, and Form 
At the time of the first consent decision, the execution of the sexual 
advance directive should comply with certain formalities to ensure that the 
consent is authentic and voluntary. Formalities are most common in the 
area of wills, where a writing, signature, and attestation of two witnesses 
are typically required.167 Powers of attorney tend to be less stringent in the 
formalities required, generally needing only a writing and signature.168 
Health care advance directives fall somewhere in the middle, often 
requiring the formalities of wills but with execution requirements varying 
significantly from state to state.169 
 
167.  See James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541, 
550 (1990) (noting how these three requirements have persisted in various forms). 
168.  See Carolyn L. Dessin, Acting As Agent Under A Financial Durable Power of Attorney: An 
Unscripted Role, 75 NEB. L. REV. 574, 581–82 (1996) (“With respect to execution formalities, durable 
powers of attorney are generally easier to execute than wills. Typically, the only execution requirements 
are that the power be in writing and signed by the principal.”). But see FLA STAT. ANN. § 709.2105 
(West 2013) (requiring two witnesses as well). 
169.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3221 (West 2014) (requiring a writing, signature, and 
notarization or a witness who affirms that a notary was present); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-104 
(West 2011 & Supp. 2015) (requiring a writing, signature and two witnesses for a living will); id. § 15-
14-506 (2011) (requiring no witnesses for a durable medical power of attorney); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
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Sexual advance directives should be executed with the heightened level 
of formalities that are traditionally required of wills. These formalities 
serve important evidentiary and channeling functions for the court.170 
Because the document will be examined in the context of a civil or criminal 
trial with serious allegations such as rape or sexual battery, it is important 
that the sexual advance directive provide good evidence of the person’s 
intent with respect to sexual consent or the delegation of the sexual consent 
decision.171 This simplifies the court’s job of determining prospective 
consent, including what agent was trusted to carry out the principal’s 
wishes, which sexual acts were contemplated, and with whom. Many states 
include a statutory form that is suggested for execution of health care 
advance directives, and any sexual advance directives statute should 
provide for this as well.172 Such a statutory form would allow the court to 
process such documents quickly and assess whether they were truly 
executed with the intent to grant prospective consent.173 
These formalities also serve important ritual, protective, and expressive 
functions for the individual executing the document. First, they flag the 
creation of the sexual advance directive as an important endeavor, since it 
requires some level of ceremony or ritual.174 This impresses upon the 
person executing the document that she is creating an important record that 
will have legal effect. Given the importance of sexual consent decisions, 
this guards against the executor acting in a careless or flippant way. The 
formalities are also protective. Witnesses can help ensure that the advance 
directive is not signed under duress and that the person executing it has 
sufficient capacity to do so.175 This brings in third parties to ensure that the 
signer is not intoxicated, unconscious, or suffering from some sort of 
 
§ 39-4510 (West Supp. 2016) (requiring no witnesses for either a living will or a durable power of 
attorney for healthcare); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-56 (West 2007) (requiring either two witnesses, a 
notary, or execution before a lawyer or other person authorized to administer oaths for a health care 
advance directive); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-107 (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 2016) (allowing oral or 
written proxy directives, but also requiring one disinterested witness). 
170.  See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 
YALE L.J. 1, 6–7 (1941) (discussing the evidence problem in the will context, namely that the testator 
cannot testify as to the contents of her will). 
171.  See John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 
492 (1975) (“The primary purpose of the Wills Act has always been to provide the court with reliable 
evidence of testamentary intent and of the terms of the will.”). 
172.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-575 (2011) (providing a suggested form); 755 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 35/3 (2007) (same). 
173.  Langbein, supra note 171, at 493–94 (noting how standardization is useful to both the court 
and the individual). 
174.  See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 170, at 5 (“Compliance with the total combination of 
requirements for the execution of formal attested wills has a marked ritual value, since the general 
ceremonial precludes the possibility that the testator was acting in a casual or haphazard fashion.”) 
(footnote omitted); see also Langbein, supra note 171, at 494–95 (terming it the “cautionary function”). 
175.  See Anne-Marie Rhodes, Notarized Wills, 27 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 419, 425–26 (2014). 
But see generally Lindgren, supra note 167 (arguing against the attestation requirement). 
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mental disorder at the time of execution. Finally, the execution of the 
advance directive presents an opportunity to formally declare one’s sexual 
intent, which can be a meaningful process in recognizing an important 
relationship or sexual identity.176 
The content of the sexual advance directive is as important as its 
execution. The jurisprudence of delegation provides helpful guidance on 
this issue. Delegation of controversial powers typically requires a specific 
delegation, rather than a general delegation of authority over the entire 
decision-making domain.177 In the financial realm, these so-called “hot 
powers” tend to be those that have the potential to dissipate the assets of an 
estate or to change an existing estate plan, such as making gifts, creating 
trusts, or allowing an agent to change beneficiary designations.178 In the 
sexual context, these specific delegations take on a more personal flavor, 
implicating sexual decisions that might be entangled with one’s life plan, 
rather than estate plan.179 
Thus, a general authorization of all possible sexual encounters or a 
delegation of all sexual decision-making power should not be permissible, 
as it does not force the individual filling out the advance directive to 
contemplate actively and precisely the prospective consent being given or 
the delegation being made.180 This comports with the fact that sexual 
consent decisions are consents to specific sexual acts, and the structure of 
the sexual advance directive form should encourage thinking in these 
terms. Here, a lesson can be drawn from the format of the Uniform Power 
of Attorney Act, which lists various specific powers to be delegated with 
boxes to be initialed next to them.181 
 
176.  See David Horton, Testation and Speech, 101 GEO. L.J. 61, 61 (2012) (noting the ways in 
which wills and trusts convey important meanings). 
177.  See, e.g., Tenn. Farmers Life Reassurance Co. v. Rose, 239 S.W.3d 743, 748–49 (Tenn. 
2007). 
178.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Kurrelmeyer, 895 A.2d 207, 211–12 (Vt. 2006) (finding specific 
authorization to create a trust). 
179.  See Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Personal Delegations, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1268 
(2013). 
180.  See Linda S. Whitton, The Uniform Power of Attorney Act: Striking a Balance Between 
Autonomy and Protection, 1 PHOENIX L. REV. 343, 348 (2008) (“Requiring a specific grant of authority 
for these hot powers not only protects principals from the inadvertent grant of potentially dangerous 
powers, but also clarifies that a principal may delegate such authority if desired.”). 
181.  Below is the relevant portion of the statutory form from the Uniform Act: 
GRANT OF SPECIFIC AUTHORITY (OPTIONAL) 
My agent MAY NOT do any of the following specific acts for me UNLESS I have INITIALED the 
specific authority listed below: 
 
(CAUTION: Granting any of the following will give your agent the authority to take actions that could 
significantly reduce your property or change how your property is distributed at your death. INITIAL 
ONLY the specific authority you WANT to give your agent.) 
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Similarly, the sexual advance directive form should note whether 
certain sexual acts are being authorized (an instructional directive) or if the 
power to authorize a particular sexual act is being delegated to another (a 
proxy directive). It should also list a variety of sexual acts, both 
mainstream and non-mainstream, with boxes alongside them, allowing for 
an initialing of which acts one might wish to authorize in the future or 
allow an agent to authorize in the future. Alongside each box should be a 
blank line indicating if those acts are limited to particular individuals or if 
the choice of sexual partner is open.182 Thus, a person wishing only to 
preserve a vanilla spousal sexual relationship could authorize a couple of 
sexual acts with one person. Alternatively, the hedonist could authorize a 
wide variety of sexual acts with every possible sexual partner. Having 
myriad sexual acts represented on the form has the benefit of normalizing 
the many forms of sexual expression that might exist in the population. If a 
shorter form were desired, any shortened list should be informed by current 
social science research on the dominant sexual practices of the 
population.183 
It is worth noting that sexual advance directives are only helpful to the 
extent that an individual actually plans in advance, and plans in advance 
well. To this end, sexual advance directives will work better in a more sex-
positive culture.184 The execution of the directive itself requires that 
individuals reflect upon and put down in writing their sexual wishes. In a 
more sex-negative culture, people will avoid advance planning on matters 
of sexuality, predict badly what they might want out of their future sexual 
 
(___) Create, amend, revoke, or terminate an inter vivos trust 
(___) Make a gift, subject to the limitations of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act and any special 
instructions in this power of attorney 
(___) Create or change rights of survivorship 
(___) Create or change a beneficiary designation 
(___) Authorize another person to exercise the authority granted under this power of attorney 
(___) Waive the principal’s right to be a beneficiary of a joint and survivor annuity, including a 
survivor benefit under a retirement plan 
(___) Exercise fiduciary powers that the principal has authority to delegate 
(___) Disclaim or refuse an interest in property, including a power of appointment 
 
UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 301 (2006). 
182.  Thus, each line would contain a place to initial, followed by a type of sexual act, followed 
by a space for partner designation. For example: 
(___) Oral sex _________________________________________________________ 
183.  See William B. Rubenstein, Do Gay Rights Laws Matter?: An Empirical Assessment, 75 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 65, 83–86 (2001) (discussing different types of sex surveys). 
184.  See Kaplan, supra note 7, at 95 (“A sex-positive framework values sexual autonomy and all 
forms of consensual sexual activities as sources of pleasure and fulfillment. It rejects a view that sex 
and sexual pleasure are shameful. It respects diverse ways of expressing and experiencing sexuality and 
sexual pleasure, and rejects a culture that privileges male or heterosexual desire and pleasure above 
female or queer desire and pleasure.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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lives, or be less forthcoming about their sexual desires. None of these 
contributes to a healthy sexual advance directives regime. 
Even in a sex-positive culture, it is quite possible that an individual will 
avoid sexual advance planning, just as individuals avoid advance planning 
in other contexts.185 It is also quite possible that an individual might not 
predict with accuracy her future sexual desires, or she may select an agent 
who will do a poor job.186 In all of these cases, the current nature-and-
consequences test of legal capacity would continue to prohibit those 
lacking sufficient cognitive capacities from engaging in sexual activity, 
regardless of sexual desire or the positive welfare effects of the sexual 
expression at Time 2. Permitting a sexual life for individuals in these 
circumstances—and for those who have persistent lifelong impairments 
and are not permitted to plan in advance at all—thus requires reform of the 
existing legal regime governing the capacity to consent to sex. I have 
offered reforms along these lines in other work.187 
This Article presents an alternative solution that would enable people 
who did have the motivation and foresight to plan ahead to do so and 
control their future sexual lives on a more individual basis. This solution 
shares both the strengths and weaknesses of other forms of advance 
planning, and it will not be appealing to those who do not believe that 
advance planning is feasible. For those who have not given up on advance 
planning, however, the goal should be to find ways to increase and make 
effective advance planning of all types. Several commentators have 
suggested multiple innovative and promising ideas for accomplishing 
this.188 This Article is also animated in part by the hope that with the aging 
of the population advance planning becomes a more salient and routine 
exercise in health care, finances, housing, sexuality, and other domains. 
 
185. See Daniel P. Hickey, The Disutility of Advance Directives: We Know the Problems, but Are 
There Solutions?, 36 J. HEALTH L. 455, 457–60 (2003) (discussing the barriers to completion of health-
care advance directives); Michael R. McCunney & Alyssa A. DiRusso, Marketing Wills, 16 ELDER L.J. 
33, 35 (2008) (discussing reasons why people do not execute wills). 
186.  See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 
80 IND. L.J. 155, 172–81 (2005) (discussing reasons why people are poor predictors of their own 
emotional states). 
187.  See Boni-Saenz, supra note 24, at 1234–44 (advocating a move away from a cognitive 
approach to legal capacity towards a network approach that would permit sexual expression among 
people with persistent cognitive impairments). 
188.  See, e.g., Joseph Karl Grant, The Advance Directive Registry or Lockbox: A Model 
Proposal and Call to Legislative Action, 37 J. LEGIS. 81, 83 (2011) (arguing for advance directive 
registries); Marshall B. Kapp, The Nursing Home As Part of the Polst Paradigm, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 
151, 168–69 (2013) (arguing for the use of POLST in nursing homes, as opposed to advance 
directives); Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 
B.C. L. REV. 877, 920–24 (2012) (suggesting a “testamentary schedule” on the state individual income 
tax return). 
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2. Contemporaneous Affirmative Consent 
While formalities help to ensure the quality of the prospective consent 
at Time 1, the token of consent that is given contemporaneously with the 
sexual act at Time 2 must also be authentic and entered into voluntarily. As 
a threshold matter, one must have the ability to express volition.189 While 
many people with Alzheimer’s Disease or dementia will possess this 
capacity, there are many who will not. Some conditions will be so severe 
that an individual cannot coherently communicate a token of consent at all, 
either through words or action.190 Alternatively, one might be able to 
express volition, but a cognitive impairment renders one so suggestible that 
said expression of volition cannot be said to be voluntary.191 One cannot 
provide the necessary contemporaneous token of consent here either, as it 
will not be clear that this expression truly conveys a desire originating 
primarily from an internal, subjective mental state. 
Once these basic requirements are met, there must also be actual verbal 
or nonverbal evidence of consent.192 This could be a verbal “Yes,” but it 
could also come in the form of initiation or active pursuit of sexual 
expression.193 It may also be specific to the individual, as every person has 
unique forms of communication or ways of initiating sexual encounters.194 
For example, one man noted that his wife with Alzheimer’s Disease 
initiated sexual contact by asking, “Shall we play a little bit?”195 To an 
outsider, this verbal cue would not necessarily be indicative of a desire to 
consent to sexual contact. This points to the importance of involving people 
in the sexual decision-making process who know the person with cognitive 
impairments well. 
 
189.  See Chunlin Leonhard, The Unbearable Lightness of Consent in Contract Law, 63 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 57, 67 (2012) (noting that volition is one of the necessary components of consent). 
190.  See Robert Audi, Volition, Intention, and Responsibility, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1680 
(1994) (discussing the importance of volition as acts of will or as playing an “executory role in action”). 
This essentially puts us in a position of Time 2 silence, which, as noted earlier, would not be a 
defensible context for permitting sexual advance directives. 
191.  JOAN MCGREGOR, IS IT RAPE?: ON ACQUAINTANCE RAPE AND TAKING WOMEN’S 
CONSENT SERIOUSLY 141–42 (2005) (describing how certain cognitive impairments make one much 
more vulnerable to manipulation). 
192.  See, e.g., People v. Miranda, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 315, 339 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“A person 
can have the ability to give consent even though he or she responds to questions with one or two-word 
answers and with physical gestures.”). 
193.  See Carole Archibald, Sexuality and Dementia: The Role Dementia Plays When Sexual 
Expression Becomes a Component of Residential Care Work, 4 ALZHEIMER’S CARE Q. 137, 139–40 
(2003) (telling the story of Will and Wilma, both with cognitive impairments, who pursued a sexual 
relationship despite opposition from facility staff); Henneberger, supra note 82. 
194.  See MALCOLM GOLDSMITH, HEARING THE VOICE OF PEOPLE WITH DEMENTIA 56–59 
(1996) (discussing communication strategies for individuals with dementia). 
195.  See Gruley, supra note 14. 
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Thus, the consent at Time 2 should be judged using an affirmative 
consent standard, which construes silence and lack of action as non-
consent.196 This standard has received plenty of attention recently, as many 
colleges have adopted it in response to concerns about sexual assault on 
campus.197 It has, however, been controversial.198 Many of the concerns 
focus on the shift of risk to the defendant that such a standard entails; 
proceeding with an encounter without consent in words or actions from a 
sexual partner now carries risk of legal liability.199 
Whatever one’s views of the affirmative consent standard generally, 
the case for its application to this context is particularly strong. The 
population at issue is operating with some form of cognitive and possibly 
also communicative impairment. Thus, a more demanding consent standard 
is needed to incentivize sexual partners to ensure that there is a true mental 
state of acquiescence to the sexual act, as embodied in words or action.200 
Because of the vulnerability of this population, it is reasonable for the law 
to structure the sexual transaction so that sexual partners without 
impairments must engage with a sense of care and caution.201 In other 
words, any risk-shifting that the standard implies is justified by the 
disadvantaged social position of one of the sexual partners.202 
 
196.  See SCHULHOFER, supra note 24, at 280 (“What decent protection of sexual autonomy 
requires is . . . a recognition that sexual intimacy must always be preceded by the affirmative, freely 
given permission of both parties.”); David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 400 
(2000) (“Under the affirmative-consent rule, there would be a rebuttable presumption of nonconsent, 
which would be overcome by any affirmative expression of desire for sex.”); Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A 
Feminist Analysis, 8 L. & PHIL. 217, 242 (1989) (advocating for a model of “communicative consent”). 
197.  See Jake New, The “Yes Means Yes” World, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 17, 2014), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/10/17/colleges-across-country-adopting-affirmative-
consent-sexual-assault-policies (noting that 800 colleges have adopted the affirmative consent 
standard); see also Reid Wilson, California to Require ‘Affirmative Consent’ Before Sex, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/09/29/california-to-require-
affirmative-consent-before-sex/ (discussing California’s recent adoption of an affirmative consent 
standard for its college campuses). 
198.  See, e.g., KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR & FEMINISM ON CAMPUS 62 
(1993) (critiquing affirmative consent for portraying women as lacking agency to communicate their 
desires); Dan Subotnik, Copulemus in Pace: A Meditation on Rape, Affirmative Consent to Sex, and 
Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 847, 860–61 (2008) (suggesting that affirmative consent does not 
reflect current social norms around sex). 
199.  See Tuerkheimer, supra note 26, at 12–13 (summarizing the concerns). 
200.  See Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1421–27 (2005) 
(conceptualizing sex as a negotiation process). 
201.  See Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On Date Rape and Self-Deception, 28 HARV. J.L. 
& GENDER 381, 437–39 (2005) (highlighting how engaging in a sexual situation with an attitude of care 
can help prevent self-deception). 
202.  See Katharine K. Baker, Gender and Emotion in Criminal Law, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 
447, 453–54 (2005) (noting that affirmative consent is justified when there is greater risk to one of the 
sexual partners). Some have instead argued for implicit consent based on marital status rather than an 
affirmative consent standard. See generally Roy G. Spece, Jr. et al., (Implicit) Consent to Intimacy, 50 
IND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017). There are two major problems with such an approach. First, it 
seemingly reinserts a resistance requirement into rape law for cognitively impaired individuals. This 
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The Time 2 contemporaneous consent will take place in the context of 
an institution in which the person with persistent cognitive impairments 
resides. This both presents an opportunity to ensure a contemporaneous 
token of consent that is consistent with the wishes outlined in the sexual 
advance directive and highlights a potential privacy tradeoff in 
implementing sexual advance directives.203 Many institutions will 
understandably want both to protect residents from sexual abuse and to 
protect themselves from legal liability. To accomplish these objectives, 
these institutions may decide to monitor electronically all resident sexual 
activity to ensure that there is contemporaneous consent.204  
For residents who are more severely cognitively impaired but who can 
still express volition, this type of monitoring may indeed be necessary for 
protective purposes. Individuals with significant cognitive impairments 
may not be able to communicate that there was sexual contact that 
exceeded the scope of consent, that there was a withdrawal of sexual 
consent during the act itself, or that some other consent-based problem was 
present in the sexual encounter. The privacy cost that this type of 
monitoring entails is one that some individuals or their partners will not be 
willing to stomach. Said individuals are free to make the valid choice of 
privacy over sexual expression. For those who are willing to sacrifice some 
privacy for the opportunity to engage in sexual expression and the physical 
and social benefits it provides, however, the tradeoff may be worth it.205 
 
requirement, already inappropriate for those without impairments, is particularly unsuitable for people 
with persistent cognitive impairments, who often have diminished capacity to express dissent. Second, 
even if it were appropriate, it fails to provide a solution for those who lack a spouse or simply desire 
sexual contact with non-spousal partners. 
203.  See Kristine S. Knaplund, The Right of Privacy and America’s Aging Population, 86 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 439, 442 (2009) (discussing this tradeoff). 
204.  This raises a similar set of issues as those that have been raised in the so-called “granny 
cam” debates. See generally Katherine Anne Meier, Removing the Menacing Specter of Elder Abuse in 
Nursing Homes Through Video Surveillance, 50 GONZ. L. REV. 29 (2015) (arguing for increased 
surveillance in nursing homes to combat elder abuse); Bradley J.B. Toben & Matthew C. Cordon, 
Legislative Stasis: The Failures of Legislation and Legislative Proposals Permitting the Use of 
Electronic Monitoring Devices in Nursing Homes, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 675 (2007) (discussing 
legislative movement on these issues). Monitoring in the context of sexual advance directives would 
require a more limited form of electronic surveillance than that proposed in many states, as it would 
only apply to sexual encounters rather than to the entire nursing home. This would help to avoid some 
of the objections raised about the privacy interests of other residents and nursing home staff in the cases 
of general surveillance. 
205.  Empirical studies indicate that privacy preferences in the population are heterogeneous. See 
Victoria Schwartz, Disclosing Corporate Disclosure Policies, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 487, 502–05 
(2013) (discussing the various empirical studies). In addition, privacy may be a less salient issue when 
one is experiencing various forms of impairment that create a need for assistance, even in intimate 
tasks. See Cheryl Marie Wade, It Ain’t Exactly Sexy, in THE RAGGED EDGE: THE DISABILITY 
EXPERIENCE FROM THE FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE DISABILITY RAG 92 (Barrett Shaw ed., 1994) 
(“[W]e must have our asses cleaned after we shit and pee. Or we have others’ fingers inserted into our 
rectums to assist shitting. Or we have tubes of plastic inserted inside us to assist peeing or we have re-
routed anuses and pissers so we do it all into bags attached to our bodies. These blunt, crude realities. 
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It is important to remember, however, that there are many levels of 
cognitive impairment, and those who are less cognitively impaired (but still 
of questionable legal capacity) may not require such invasive 
monitoring.206 This is not to say that institutional staff should ignore sexual 
encounters in these circumstances—and thus miss out on potential calls of 
distress—but they need not monitor the entire sexual encounter in detail 
either. This grey area of legal capacity is where sexual advance directives 
might be most useful, as they would permit sexual activity under relatively 
“normal” conditions for the sexual participants, while easing fears of 
liability for institutions. In sum, these privacy tradeoffs must be handled on 
a case-by-case basis, taking into account the level of cognitive impairment 
and the particulars of the sexual interaction. A blanket policy of invasive 
monitoring of all resident sexual activity would thus be misguided, as it 
may not always be necessary to reasonably ensure contemporaneous 
consent. 
B. Third-Party Oversight and Fiduciary Duties 
Advance directives always require third-party interaction and oversight 
for successful implementation.207 Instructional directives are not self-
executing, creating a need for someone or some entity to interpret and 
implement them.208 The law leans heavily on trusted institutions or 
professions to perform this implementation function in other areas.209 In 
fact, the implementing entity is typically the one towards whom the 
advance decision is directed. For example, doctors are supposed to honor 
the treatment preferences expressed in a living will, and they are bound by 
 
Our daily lives. Yeah, I know it ain’t exactly sexy . . . . The difference between those of us who need 
attendants and those who don’t is the difference between those who know privacy and those who 
don’t.”). Finally, it may be the case that individuals with cognitive impairments may not even recognize 
the need for privacy in sexual encounters, especially if their sexual behaviors are a result of 
disinhibition. 
206.  For example, in a recent case of sex among nursing home residents with dementia in Iowa, 
an eighty-seven-year-old woman in the encounter had demonstrated the capacity to violently reject 
situations that displeased her, and in fact had expressed this capacity to fight off nursing home staff that 
tried to terminate her intercourse with a fellow resident. See Boni-Saenz, supra note 24, at 1214–15 
(describing the case). 
207.  See Holm, supra note 111, at 158. 
208.  See Muriel R. Gillick, Doing the Right Thing: A Geriatrician’s Perspective on Medical 
Care for the Person with Advanced Dementia, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 51, 54 (2012); see also Holm, 
supra note 111, at 158 (arguing that we will never “be able to relieve the care giver of his or her 
obligation to personally assess the desires and decisions of . . . possibly incompetent patients and 
ethically choose which to respect and which to counteract”). 
209.  See George J. Alexander, Time for a New Law on Health Care Advance Directives, 42 
HASTINGS L.J. 755, 760 (1991) (discussing how directives are aimed at the physician). 
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a code of ethics and are subject to state licensing regimes.210 Similarly, 
wills are addressed to the probate court, and judges are supposed to honor 
the wishes of the testator as embodied in the distributional directives in the 
will.211 
In the case of a proxy directive, the principal designates an agent who 
has the authority to make decisions. Even these agents, however, must 
interact with third parties in order to actualize their authority under the 
directive. Health-care agents must cooperate with the medical profession to 
implement health-care decisions, and financial agents acting under a power 
of attorney must often deal with financial institutions in order to manage 
the financial resources of the principal. In addition to the natural check 
provided by these institutions and professions, agents are further 
constrained by fiduciary duties, which subject them to judicial oversight. 
Remedies for breach of these fiduciary duties are typically quite severe, 
both to channel moral outrage at the abuse of trust that they entail and to 
act as a strong deterrent against future breaches.212 
Long-term care facilities, such as assisted-living facilities, nursing 
homes, and continuing-care retirement communities, fill this role for sexual 
advance directives. They house a large proportion of older adults with 
cognitive impairments, thus granting them familiarity with this population 
and its needs.213 In addition, these institutions already actively manage both 
the social environment and intimate care of residents.214 In serving 
 
210.  See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL 
ETHICS (7th ed. 2012) (the seminal text of medical ethics); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Necessary and 
Proper Role of Regulation to Assure the Quality of Health Care, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 525, 533 (1988) 
(discussing the regulation of the medical profession). 
211.  See Alexander, supra note 209; see also McLean v. Brasfield, 460 So. 2d 153, 155 (Ala. 
1984) (“The polestar to guide a court in the construction of a will is the intent of the testator . . . .”). 
212.  See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (noting that fiduciaries are “held to 
something stricter than the morals of the market place”); Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of 
Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1039, 1043 (2011) (“Stripped of legalistic formalisms and moralizing 
rhetoric, the functional core of the fiduciary obligation is deterrence.”) (footnote omitted). 
213.  Theoretically, professional sex workers could also help to fill this role, and there is some 
evidence that they do so successfully in other countries by specializing in populations who have 
cognitive impairments. See DOUGLAS WORNELL, SEXUALITY AND DEMENTIA 159 (2014) (noting how 
sex workers may have a role to play in addressing the sexual needs of older adults with dementia); 
KULICK & RYDSTRÖM, supra note 88, at 205–16 (describing how sex workers in Denmark provide 
services to people with cognitive disabilities). In the United States, however, sex work is generally 
prohibited by law, and thus has not achieved any significant level of professional organization or a 
separate code of ethics. See Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 523, 526 (2000) (“The United States is unique among the nations of Western Europe and the 
British Commonwealth in imposing and enforcing criminal sanctions on people who offer sexual 
services for money.”). In addition, this is at best a partial solution as a person with cognitive 
impairments may desire sexual partners beyond those involved in sex work. 
214.  See Julian C. Hughes et al., Sexuality in Dementia, in THE LAW AND ETHICS OF DEMENTIA 
227, 232–36 (Charles Foster et al. eds., 2014) (discussing several cases exploring the complexity of the 
relationships between family members, staff, and residents); Andrew Weinberg, Risk Management and 
Quality-of-Care Concerns in Long-Term Care, in 7 ETHICS, LAW, AND AGING REVIEW: LIABILITY 
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residents’ various needs, these institutions should treat sexual expression 
similarly to other issues that are routinely managed, such as nutrition, 
pressure ulcers, or medical treatment.215 Medical professionals operating in 
long-term care facilities are beginning to grapple formally with resident 
sexuality, indicating a desire to tackle this issue as well.216 
Practically, this means protecting the individual with cognitive 
impairments from the objective welfare threats entailed by sexual contact. 
This oversight is needed because such concerns could not enter into the 
decision-making process at Time 1 because they were not known. Nor 
could they enter at Time 2 because the cognitive impairment prevents their 
contemplation. The content of this protection depends on the situation, but 
examples might include providing a physical space that minimizes risk of 
fall or physical injury during sexual activity217 and guarding against threats 
to the health of the person with cognitive impairments, such as sexually 
transmitted diseases.218 As noted earlier, there will likely be some tradeoff 
between due care and privacy, as more intrusive measures might be needed 
to manage sexual expression of nursing home residents. Whether or not 
these privacy invasions are warranted or whether the sexual contact would 
still be desired given the privacy tradeoff is something that should be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the institution in consultation with 
family members.219 
This is not to say that long-term care institutions are perfectly suited to 
perform these tasks; in fact, many institutions are substandard.220 Sexual 
advance directives will work best in a quality system of long-term care, and 
many institutions may not be prepared to implement them yet. Facilitating 
the sexual lives of residents is possible only if long-term care institutions 
 
ISSUES AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN CARING FOR OLDER PERSONS 101, 103–04 (Marshall B. Kapp ed., 
2001) (discussing the different areas of long-term care management). 
215.  See Fay A. Rozovksy, Informed Consent as a Loss Control Process, in 2 RISK 
MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK FOR HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS: CLINICAL RISK MANAGEMENT 77, 92–
97 (Roberta Carroll & Sylvia M. Brown eds., 6th ed. 2011) (describing the importance of these types of 
procedures generally). 
216.  See AMDA–THE SOCIETY FOR POST-ACUTE AND LONG-TERM CARE MEDICINE, CAPACITY 
FOR SEXUAL CONSENT IN DEMENTIA IN LONG TERM CARE (2016) (a recent white paper on this topic by 
the medical specialty society of health professionals operating in long-term care facilities). 
217.  See Marshall B. Kapp, Resident Safety and Medical Errors in Nursing Homes Reporting 
and Disclosure in a Culture of Mutual Distrust, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 51, 59–60 (2003) (discussing the 
problem of falls in nursing homes). 
218.  See GAYLE APPEL DOLL, SEXUALITY & LONG-TERM CARE: UNDERSTANDING AND 
SUPPORTING THE NEEDS OF OLDER ADULTS 216–20 (2012) (discussing sexual health strategies in long-
term care). 
219.  See Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, To Be or to Exist: Standards for Deciding Whether Dementia 
Patients in Nursing Homes Should Engage in Intimacy, Sex, and Adultery, 42 IND. L. REV. 675, 694–95 
(2009) (discussing the importance of involving family members in the decision-making process). 
220.  See, e.g., Seymour Moskowitz, Golden Age in the Golden State: Contemporary Legal 
Developments in Elder Abuse and Neglect, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 589, 627 (2003) (discussing issues of 
abuse and neglect in nursing homes). 
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are cognizant of the needs for sexual expression among residents and adopt 
policies that facilitate sexual environments with sexual choice and freedom 
from sexual abuse.221 Underlying the ability of long-term care institutions 
to facilitate sexual expression is the basic economic issue of providing 
adequate financing for long-term care services.222 Such funding would 
assist in addressing one of the largest chronic problems among nursing 
homes, which is understaffing.223 If long-term care institutions are expected 
to manage the sexual lives of residents in line with sexual advance 
directives, they must have sufficient manpower to conduct capacity 
assessments and to manage residents’ social and physical environments. 
Sexual agents empowered by sexual advance directives must also 
interact with these institutions to convey and implement sexual decisions. 
In exercising their power under sexual advance directives, these sexual 
agents bear the burden of fiduciary duty.224 A fiduciary is an individual 
who is in a position of power and trust with respect to another person, 
putting that other person at risk if the fiduciary does not act in her 
interests.225 Because of their position of power and trust, fiduciaries have 
certain duties.226 The first is the duty of care, which requires the agent to 
“perform their services with prudence, attention, and proficiency.”227 The 
second is the duty of loyalty, which requires that an agent act in the 
interests of the person for whom the agent is a fiduciary.228 
A sexual agent’s duty of care mimics the requirement that institutions 
adhere to a standard of care with respect to their residents, requiring that 
 
221.  See Winnie Hu, Too Old for Sex? Not at This Nursing Home, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/nyregion/too-old-for-sex-not-at-this-nursing-home.html 
(describing the sexual expression policy at Hebrew Home and the resulting sexual activity among 
residents). 
222.  See Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Planning’s Greatest Gap: Funding Long-Term Care, 11 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 407, 409 (2007) (discussing the problems in the funding of long-term care). 
223.  See MARGARET C. JASPER, HOSPITAL LIABILITY LAW 86 (2d ed. 2008) (“More than one-
half of American nursing homes are below the suggested minimum staffing level for nurse’s aides, and 
more than one-third of nursing homes fell below the suggested minimum staffing level for registered 
nurses. Of total licensed staff, nearly one-fourth of all nursing homes routinely fall below the suggested 
minimum staffing level.”); Donna R. Lenhoff, LTC Regulation and Enforcement: An Overview from the 
Perspective of Residents and Their Families, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 9, 11 (2005) (noting the problem of 
understaffing in long-term facilities). 
224.  See Vogt v. Warnock, 107 S.W.3d 778, 784 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that the power of 
attorney conclusively creates a fiduciary relationship); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory 
of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1455–56 (2002) (grouping agency relationships among the 
“easy” cases of fiduciary relationships). 
 225. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 4 (2011) (“While the definitions of fiduciaries are 
not identical, all definitions share three main elements: (1) entrustment of property or power, (2) 
entrustors’ trust of fiduciaries, and (3) risk to the entrustors emanating from the entrustment.”). 
 226. See id. at 103. 
 227. Id. at 169. 
 228. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An agent has a 
fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency 
relationship.”). 
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sexual agents work to eliminate objective harms to the principal generated 
by sexual expression. Thus, there is a convergence of interests between the 
sexual agent and the institution with which they deal, all geared towards 
protecting the principal from harm.229 The duty of loyalty means that the 
individual must act within the scope of the consent granted in the sexual 
advance directive and the consent granted at the time of the sexual 
transaction.230 Thus, in this context, it duplicates the requirement to honor 
the consensus of consents. 
There is an additional wrinkle, however, in the duty of loyalty for many 
sexual agents. In numerous cases, the sexual agent will also be a primary 
sexual partner of the person with cognitive impairments, such as a spouse. 
This technically constitutes a conflict of interest, and the traditional 
understanding of the duty of loyalty prohibits such conflicts.231 The 
consequence of adopting the traditional view would be to prohibit sexual 
contact and deprive many people of a continued long-term sexual 
relationship that was likely the goal in executing a sexual advance directive 
in the first place. This problem is not unique to the sexual sphere, as 
powers of attorney often empower agents whose economic or other 
interests intersect with those of the principal as well.232 Thus, the modern 
view, embodied in the Uniform Power of Attorney Act, permits such 
conflicts if they are in the best interests of the principal.233 This recognizes 
that proxy directives are meant to be a more informal way of handling the 
delegation of decision-making, and that such conflicts may be an inevitable 
consequence of delegation to family members or loved ones.234 
 
229.  Each will serve as a check on the other to ensure that neither has become a “rebel proxy” 
whose judgment should be overridden because she or it is not acting in the interests of the person with 
cognitive impairments. See ROBERT S. OLICK, TAKING ADVANCE DIRECTIVES SERIOUSLY: 
PROSPECTIVE AUTONOMY AND DECISIONS NEAR THE END OF LIFE 174–76 (2003). 
230.  UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114 (2006) (discussing this as one of the three non-
waivable elements of the agency). The other two are that the agent act in good faith and “act in 
accordance with the principal’s reasonable expectations to the extent actually known by the agent and, 
otherwise, in the principal’s best interest.” Id. 
231.  See Hartmann v. Hartle, 122 A. 615, 615 (N.J. Ch. 1928); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 78 (“[T]he trustee is strictly prohibited from engaging in transactions that involve self-dealing 
or that otherwise involve or create a conflict between the trustee’s fiduciary duties and personal 
interests.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An agent has a 
fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters connected with the agency 
relationship.”); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“Counsel’s function is to 
assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of 
interest.”). 
232.  See James L. Werth, Jr., Some Personal Aspects of End-of-Life Decisionmaking, 61 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 847, 849 (2007) (discussing this in the context of the Schiavo case). 
233.  See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best 
Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929, 980–82 (2005) (describing such a rule). 
234.  See UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 114(d) (“An agent that acts with care, competence, 
and diligence for the best interest of the principal is not liable solely because the agent also benefits 
from the act or has an individual or conflicting interest in relation to the property or affairs of the 
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∗      ∗      ∗ 
This Part has sketched out how sexual advance directives might be 
implemented in practice. The goals have been to illuminate how to respect 
the consensus of consents while also protecting people with persistent 
acquired incapacity from objective harm. Residential institutions have a 
large part to play in the implementation of sexual advance directives, and 
the hope is that they will be the ones to initiate serious advance planning 
that addresses not only sexuality but also finances, health care, housing, 
and other areas. This will help promote the important perspective that there 
are many domains that contribute to the welfare of people as they age and 
enter into a new stage of life that can be marked, but only in part, by 
cognitive impairment. 
CONCLUSION 
Sexual advance directives present the possibility of a sexual life for 
those diagnosed with chronic conditions that affect cognition. This Article 
has laid out the theoretical case for them, focusing on the importance of 
respecting both a person’s past wishes and present desires. It has also laid 
out how the law could realistically integrate sexual advance directives into 
existing doctrines of consent and capacity as well as into existing 
residential institutions of long-term care, drawing on insights from criminal 
law, fiduciary law, and the law of wills. Thus, it has contributed to the 
theoretical literature on sexual consent and addressed an important social 
and legal issue, made all the more pressing by the aging of the population. 
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